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RESUMEN 
 
Este artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura microeconómica teórica y 
empírica que investiga los efectos de la integración de los mercados de 
productos y de la internacionalización de las actividades de las firmas sobre el 
comportamiento de los sindicatos. El trabajo relaciona estos temas a la 
experiencia de Europa, indicando las lineas de investigación futura en este 
tópico. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical microeconomic literature on 
the effects of product market integration and internationalization of firms 
activities upon labor unions. It relates these issues to the European experience, 
indicating future lines of research in this field. 
JEL Classification: F21; F23; J50 
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 LABOR UNIONS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A REVIEW  
 
DOMENICO BUCCELLA1 
I. Introduction 
Economic integration is an ongoing process which has known in the last 
decades a dramatic pace of development, both at regional and global levels. 
Political issues like the reduction in tariff and other trade barriers have mainly 
driven this process, occurring either within supranational bodies like the WTO 
and the European Commission (EC), or through unilaterally moves by 
individual countries.  Falling transportation and communication costs’ further 
contributes to increase the flows of goods, services, and in same cases of 
people (workers). Furthermore, deregulation in international capital markets 
allows to move rapidly capital between different locations, leading to a process 
of disintegration of production, both of services and goods.  
The European Union (EU) emerges as one of the major results of the 
ongoing process of international integration. One of the pillars of the EU 
economic integration process was the completion of the Single Market 
Program in 1992, which came into force by 1 January 1993. It resulted in the 
adoption of measures eliminating caveats and barriers on trade (reduction of 
tariffs and the removal of non-tariff barriers) to create a large integrated 
market for goods and services (allowing to realize and exploit economies of 
scale). Other measures were aimed at generating an increasing competitive 
environment to attain (allocative and productive) efficiency gains, reducing 
distortions in national product markets. The construction of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), a second pillar of the EU integration process, 
initiated in 1990 and ended by the introduction of the Euro in 2002, has 
intensified economic integration between European countries by reducing 
trade costs and removing currency risks. The progresses in the Financial 
Service Action Plan and closer financial market integration further give a 
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contribution to the process, making international capital mobility deal in an 
easier way with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) operations.2 
The deepening of economic integration has significant consequences for 
outcomes (wage and employment levels) and institutions of European labor 
markets. Product market integration, as well as increasing transparency and 
comparability of prices across boundaries (at least in those countries adopting 
the single currency), is expected to make price competition stronger and 
reduce the margin of profits. Financial market integration has enhanced the 
importance of private capital in job creation. Both these aspects of economic 
integration pose wages and labor costs developments as key variables to 
improve the countries’ international competitiveness and attractiveness.  
While the European economy is turning out to be progressively more 
integrated, labor unions operate mostly at national level. Ongoing 
internationalization will probably continue to exert pressures on unionized 
workers. This may occur through several channels. As mentioned, increasing 
competition is a first channel (Dreher and Gaston, 2007). The presence of 
international competitors increases the number of actors in imperfectly 
competitive product markets, shrinking the economic rents over which 
employers and workers negotiate. A second channel, identified both by Rodrik 
(1997) and Dreher and Gaston (2007), has to do with the ease with which 
domestic workers can be replaced by workers abroad either through trade or 
delocalization via FDI toward countries with lower wage levels. Technically, 
trade and international production flatten the labor demand at home which 
becomes more elastic, allowing for employers to react at changes in wages 
substituting workers by moving all or part of their operations abroad. It is 
commonly perceived that product market integration reduces the relative 
bargaining power of labor unions, and European integration seems to increase 
the labor demand sensitivity to wages, which may induce labor unions to 
moderate their wage claims. In economic sectors highly exposed to 
international competition, the demand for higher wages may trigger 
considerable occupational losses because of a deteriorated competitive 
position. European integration makes less complicated for firms, 
                                                 
2 The realization of the Single Market Program and the completion of the Single Market for 
financial services has subsequently driven a growth in the figures concerning both intra-industry 
trade (see European Commission, 2008a) and intra-EU FDI (see European Commission, 2005, 
2008b; Jovanović, 2006, chap. 3, section 3.3.6). 
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predominantly Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), to spread their activities 
between plants, located in different countries, to capture advantages in terms 
of reduction in production costs. Moreover, not only effective delocalization 
but the simple threat of delocalizing weakens unions’ positions, allowing for 
firms to obtain favorable concessions during negotiations. The adoption of 
labor market policies by national Governments whose aim is to weaken union 
bargaining strength; and the institutional convergence towards the more 
decentralized, less regulated and less unionized U.S. labor market (considered 
the ideal model to face the challenges posed by international integration) are 
two additional elements (Dreher and Gaston, 2007).  
Nonetheless, following more integrated product and financial markets, and 
fostered by processes promoted by the EU institutions, notably the adoption of 
the 1994 (recently revised in 2009) European Works Councils (EWC) and the 
2001 European Company Directives, in recent times also European labor 
markets have shown signs of changes in bargaining practices. Major actors 
like trade unions, stimulated by the concern that would be opposed against 
each other in a strong competition over jobs and income, have shown 
increasing interest in trans-nationalize their activities. This took place typically 
in softer, non-binding forms, intensifying the degree of cooperation in 
coordinating their policies, and taking into account a broader perspective in 
negotiation strategies at every level (the “Europeanization” of collective 
bargaining). To pursue these objectives, since 1998, the sharing of common 
rules in collective bargaining to confederate negotiators (the “guideline for 
collective bargaining at the European level”) by the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), and institutions such as multinational collective 
bargains has been introduced. However, similar practices emerged also in 
initiatives apart from the ETUC, like the “Doorn agreement”, a transnational 
agreement endorsed by the national trade unions of Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 1998, whose central points were wage 
demand coordination and the support of occupational growth.3  
While the ETUC and the “Doorn agreement” provide guidelines and policy 
orientations in coordinating activities at cross sectoral level, unions in the 
European Industry Federations (EIF) mainly pursued at the industry level these 
initiatives, according to the sector they cover. Within the EIFs, the European 
                                                 
3 See European Commission (2002) for an extensive review on coordination activities about 
collective bargaining.  
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Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) is in a leading position. The EMF was the 
first industry level union federation which adopted a “coordination approach” 
to attain a European dimension in coordination activities related to national 
bargaining policies and minimum standards. With the purpose of preventing 
possible downward competition on wages and working conditions, in 
December 1998 the EMF, in defining its own strategy, adopted the so-called 
“European coordination rule”. This “coordination rule” is based on two central 
elements: a joint commitment to European guidelines for national collective 
bargaining, aimed at preventing downward competition; and the political 
purpose of “EMF minimum standards” which all EMF associates should feel 
oblige to bargain for. Precisely, the EMF stated that “the wage policy of trade 
unions in all countries must be to offset the rate of inflation and  ensure that 
workers’ incomes retain a balanced participation in productivity gains”.  
The approval of the EWC Directive is modifying the level at which 
collective bargaining occurs in many industrial sectors in Europe. In fact, in 
those sectors characterized by a high incidence of Multinational Enterprises 
(MNE) operations, there is an increasing evidence of company level 
negotiations rather than industry-wide agreements. As a consequence, recently 
unions start to take advantage of the EWCs’ potential to coordinate activities 
across countries during the bargaining process. For example, in the banking 
sector, Danish trade unions received the mandate to negotiate on behalf of all 
employees working at Danske Bank (EIROnline, 2009). The EMF and UNI 
Europa Graphical (UEG, another cross border industry union belonging to the 
EIFs), devised a procedure to receive the mandate in representing the workers’ 
side all through company-wide transnational agreements  (Eurofound, 2009; 
Gennard, 2009). 
Hence, labor unions are developing trans-national cooperation strategies. In 
the next future, unions may seek to coordinate wage policies to improve their 
positions in negotiations with employers. Aim of this paper is to sum up the 
theoretical and empirical literature related to the effects of international 
integration on organized labor, considering the strategic interactions among 
economic actors in the product and labor markets. It focuses to the works 
analyzing the scope and incentives for unions’ international coordination, as a 
means to face the impact of product and capital markets’ integration. These 
issues relates in particular to the European experience. 
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The rest of the paper organizes as follows. Section 2 presents some 
preliminary considerations connected to the received literature: discussion of 
unions’ objective functions; description of the features related both to the 
bargaining processes among unions and firms, and the structure of 
international markets; discussion about the concept of economic integration. 
Section 3 provides a review of the literature on the effects of international 
trade liberalization in unionized frameworks, focusing on wage and 
employment outcomes, and on the diverse features of union coordination. 
Instead, Section 4 devotes to the internationalization of productive activities 
and its consequences for labor unions. Section 5 presents a review of the 
empirical literature on the impact of economic integration on European 
unions’ outcomes. Section 6 closes the paper. 
II. Economic integration and unionized labor markets: preliminary 
considerations  
There are some important issues to take into account when starting to 
analyze the effects of closer economic integration on unionized labor markets 
and union behavior. A first element is the union objective function. In the 
recent literature, unions are usually seen as optimizing agents, which 
maximize diverse utility functions. A general specification, encompassing 
several union objectives, is the following Stone-Geary utility function: 
)1(
_
)()( θθ −−−= llwwU  
where w  is the wage rate, w  the reservation wage; l  is the number of 
workers employed, and 
_
l  is the reservation employment. The parameter [ ]1,0∈θ  represents the relative weights that the union assigns to the rent over 
the reservation wage and the reference level of employment. The union is 
wage (employment) oriented if θθ −> 1  ( 1 )θ θ< − , or neutrally oriented 
if 21=θ . When 21=θ  and 0_ =l , the union has a rent-maximizing 
utility function. Additionally, if the reservation wage is 0=w , the union 
maximizes the total wage bill. Finally, if 1=θ , the union maximizes the 
wage premium; with 0=w , the union simply maximizes the wage rate. 
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Other functional forms often used in representing union objectives are the 
utilitarian utility function, 
)()()( bulmwluU −+=  
and its slightly modified version, the expected utility function, 
)()()( bu
m
lmwu
m
lU −+=  
where )(wu  is the utility function of the individual employed union 
member, lm ≥  represents the number of union members, generally assumed 
as fixed; b  is the alternative wage or the unemployment benefits. The 
utilitarian union utility function maximizes the sum of the utility of employed 
members and the utility of any unemployed member; the expected utility 
function maximizes the expected utility of the representative union member. If 
m  is treated as a variable, the two utility forms differ. While the utilitarian 
utility is increasing in membership because is an aggregating function, the 
expected utility is decreasing: employment is a random draw across identical 
members, and growing membership lowers for each member the probability of 
being occupied. Finally, under the assumptions of perfect symmetry in 
objectives and in preferences over wages and employment, theoretical works 
mainly describe wage coordination among (usually two) unions as efficient 
union collusion, where the sum of unions’ utility is maximized; but in some 
exceptional cases, the product of union utilities is maximized. 
A second group of features that should be taken in to account are related to 
bargaining: the scope, the type, and level.4 Concerning the scope of 
bargaining, almost all cases consider either negotiations over wages only, or 
both employment levels and wage rates. The former refers to the right-to-
manage model: unions and firms bargains over wages, but once the wage rate 
                                                 
4 Another feature related to bargaining (not covered in this work) is the timing at which 
negotiations might occur. The literature here reviewed assumes that negotiations between unions 
and firms occur at the same time at every level. That is, bargaining is synchronized. Only few 
exceptions consider the effects of  sequential bargaining: negotiations take place first in a firm, 
industry or country which is in a “leading” position, and then the agreement reached there 
becomes the “pilot agreement” for all subsequent negotiations. On this topic see De Fraja 
(1993), Dobson (1994), Corneo (1995) and Wang et al. (2009) for theoretical models; and 
Traxler and al. (2008), and Traxler, F., Brandl, B. (2009) for empirical research in European 
countries.    
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is fixed, firms have the right to decide employment levels. In this case, the 
equilibrium solution stays on the firms’ labor demand. Instead, the latter refers 
to the efficient bargaining model: firms and unions negotiate simultaneously 
over wages and employment, and the Pareto-efficient equilibrium resides 
somewhere on the contract curve’s locus to the right of the firms’ labor 
demand function. Rarely, a labor-hoarding model is considered: unions and 
firms bargain over wages and overhead labor, namely the proportion of 
unproductive time a worker is paid for. If workers value on-the-job leisure, 
overhead labor constitutes a bargaining issue for the union.  
As regards the type of negotiation, the Nash Bargaining Solution is mainly 
adopted. This implies the maximization with respect to the bargaining scope of 
the Nash Product, given by: 
)1(
_
)()( αα −Π−Π−= UUNP . 
The parameter α  captures the relative bargaining power during 
negotiations, Π represents firm profits, while _Π  and _U  are the parties’ 
outside options, or conflict payoffs in case of strikes. Several models assume 
that these are equal to zero. A special case of the Nash Product is the 
Monopoly Union model, where 1=α : unions have the complete power to fix 
wages, and subsequently firms choose the employment level. 
Bargaining between workers and employers representatives may take place 
at different levels. The most decentralized is the firm level. However, a 
distinction may be done among plant specific and company-wide agreements. 
Higher negotiation levels, involving an increasing degree of centralization, are 
industry-wide and national. In a context of increasing economic integration, 
especially referring to the European experience, also transnational bargaining 
is considered.  
A third element to take in consideration is the structure of the international 
product market, and therefore the type of competition therein. International 
competition takes place in almost all works in a two-country model, but 
exceptionally, also a three-country model may be used. It is adopted either an 
oligopoly or a monopolistic competition framework; sometimes also perfectly 
competitive markets are assumed. As regards oligopoly markets, it is assumed 
that a limited number of firms, ranging from 2 to n , compete in different 
ways: Cournot competition is the most frequently adopted model but, even if 
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more rarely, Bertrand competition and conjectural variation models are also 
present. Markets may be fully integrated, where firms decide output levels for 
the entire market; alternatively, the market segmentation hypothesis is used, 
where firms choose production levels separately for each relevant market. For 
analytical convenience and tractability, linearity in demand functions is 
generally assumed, but some works use more general functional forms. Goods 
may be homogeneous or heterogeneous as well as substitutes or complements. 
Finally, economic integration in itself represents a broad definition. It may 
refer to increasing product markets integration via international trade, due to 
reductions or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, or because of falling 
general trade cost barriers such as transportation, logistic and “red-tape” costs; 
but also to capital markets liberalization. Consequently, economic integration 
can be modeled in different ways. When refers to product markets, integration 
is generally depicted either as a marginal reduction in trade costs or in a 
change from autarky to full market integration. However, in some papers, 
product market integration is measured by other parameters as the share of 
firms which start to sell their goods in the international market, or an 
increasing substitutability among domestic and foreign goods. The advantage 
of the first approach is that the economic integration is measured by the trade 
cost parameter. This allows to analyze the effects of marginal changes in the 
degree of integration. On the other hand, this method does not capture a key 
aspect of integration: firms in different countries may enter into foreign 
markets, implying increasing product market competition. The second 
approach captures the market access aspect, but in general it compares two 
extreme regimes. If international economic integration relates to capital 
markets liberalization, this could be viewed in increasing possibilities for firms 
to undertake FDI in other countries, allowing for internationalization of 
productive activities.  
Next sections review the theoretical and empirical works on the effects of 
international economic integration on labor unions’ behavior and labor market 
outcomes, considering different dimensions and approaches towards this 
phenomenon. 
III. Labor unions and economic integration: international trade  
This section discusses the papers whose focus is the study of the labor unions’ 
behavior in a context of international trade. These works are classified in 
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accordance with the different methodologies describing international product 
market integration.5 
A. Labor unions and trade liberalization: reduction in trade barriers  
First theoretical contributions related to the effects of economic integration 
on labor markets, analyzing the related wage and employment outcomes as 
well as incentives for unions to cooperate internationally in face of increasing 
trade competition in product markets, are the models by Driffill and van der 
Ploeg (1993, 1995). 
Driffill and van der Ploeg (1993) analyze a two-country model of 
international trade with barriers whose revenues are returned as lump-sum 
subsidies. Firms in each country produce homogeneous goods and specialize 
in the production of their own exportable. The domestic and the foreign goods 
are imperfect substitutes in consumption. There are no assets; thus equilibrium 
always requires balanced trade and monetary issues need not be taken in 
consideration. Labor factor is immobile. Households maximize the following 
CES utility function which depends on the consumption of domestic )( 1x  and 
foreign )( 2x  goods,  
0
10])1[(),(
2
1
1
1
2121
==
≤<+−=
− θ
θλλ
λλ
θθθ
forxx
forxxxxU
~
         (1) 
subject to the following budget constraint 
                                                 
5 Several papers have studied the impact of trade liberalization on labor unions. These works 
considered a framework where unionized countries face product market competition from 
countries with perfectly competitive labor market. A crucial issue (not covered in this work) is 
that of strategic trade policy; that is, the choice of trade policy interventions by governments 
aiming at maximize domestic welfare. In general, these models apply in oligopoly frameworks 
and investigate the effects of the implementation of such strategic trade policy instruments as 
tariffs, subsidies and import quotas, on unionized workforce. This strand of the literature was 
pioneered by the works of Brander and Spencer (1988) and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), 
and further developed by Santoni (1996), Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (1999, 2001), 
Campbell and Vousden (2000), Bandyopadhyay, Bandyopadhyay and Park (2000), Collie and 
Vandenbussche (2005), and Ma (2008). Another topic is the analysis of different forms of trade 
liberalization as unilateral reduction in tariffs, creation of free-trade agreements or free-trade 
areas. This is the subject of the three-country models with one non-unionized country of Fisher 
and Wright (1999) and Mauleon, Song, and Vanettelbosch (2006). 
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pumtexx ==+ 21 ,                      (2) 
where λ  is the fraction of the foreign goods, m  indicates income, p  is the 
price index associated with the composite commodity u , e  denotes the real 
exchange rate, namely the price of the foreign goods in terms of home 
products, and Tt +≡ 1  with T  the tariff rate charged by the home country 
on imports. From the maximization problem, the following expression for the 
CPI is derived: 
[ ]
1)(])1[(
1)()1(
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1
1
1
=−=
>+−=
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−−
bifte
biftep bbbb
λλλ λλ
λλ          (3) 
The CPI depends on the tariffs t , the real exchange rate e  and the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, 
1])1(1[ ≥−≡ θb . Since 0>∂∂ tp , a reduction in tariff barriers leads to 
a reduction in the CPI with a consequent increase in the demand for the goods 
produced in the foreign country. In particular, when 1>b , the substitution 
effect dominates the income effect and therefore there is a reduction in the 
demand for the domestic goods; instead, with the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function )1( =b , income and substitution effects are exactly offset. 
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive market and demand l  units of 
labor, the unique factor of production, to maximize profits, wllf −)( , where 
)(lf  is a production function with diminishing returns to labor, and w  is the 
product wage. The labor demand is then )(wLl = , 01 ''' <= fL , and the 
product supply is )()]([ wQwLf ≡ ,  0'''' <= ffQ , both decreasing 
functions of the wage. Product market equilibrium requires that 
∗+= 21)( xxwQ , where ∗2x  represents exports (asterisks indicate foreign 
variables). The government distributes tariff revenues as lump-sum subsidies, 
so that sext =− 2)1(  and swQm += )( .  
Given the condition for balanced trade 22 exx =∗ , the equilibrium real 
exchange rate’s expression is ),,,(
+
∗−
+
∗−= ttwwEe ; further substitution in the 
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CPI expression yields ),,,(
+
∗+
+
∗−= ttwwPp . An increase in the domestic 
product wage decreases the aggregate product supply at home, and causes a 
relative increase in the price of home products with respect to foreign 
products. This leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (a reduction of 
e ), and consequently in a reduction of the CPI (from equation (3), 0p e∂ ∂ >
): an increase in the product wage leads to an increase in the consumption 
wage. Similarly, an increase in the foreign product wage leads to an expansion 
of the aggregate supply of the domestic goods in the home market. This in turn 
implies depreciation of the real exchange rate, and thus an increase in the CPI. 
A tariff cut at home, instead, shrinks the demand for domestic products, 
increases the demand of foreign goods. This induces depreciation of the real 
exchange rate attenuating the drop in the CPI due to the tariff reduction.  
Trade unions are supposed to maximize a utilitarian utility function which 
depends on employment and the consumption wage: 
uwLl
p
wuwLl
p
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 ,   0'>u , 0'' ≤u                    (4) 
where l  is the exogenous union membership and u  is the utility of leisure 
time. If unions suppose that their members have wage income only, equivalent 
to w  units of the domestic product, the utility of each member is linear in the 
consumption wage, 
⎟⎟⎠
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Three types of unions are considered: decentralized trade unions (D), 
centralized trade unions (C) and international trade unions (I). In case of 
decentralized unions, from equation (5) it is obtained that the maximization 
problem leads to   
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from which it is obtained that wages are set according to  
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which, given (5), becomes 
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where d1  is the inverse of the elasticity of labor demand respect to the 
real product wage: a low elasticity and high unemployment induce unions to 
set high wages. When unions are decentralized, they are so small that the 
effect of raising wages on the CPI and the exchange rate are ignored. 
In case of centralized unions, they are sufficiently large that the effect of 
increasing national wages on the domestic CPI is taken into account. It follows 
that the maximization problem now becomes, 
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from which the first order condition is:   
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Consequently, the wage rate is set  in accordance to the condition 
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which given (5) turns out to be  
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where 0/ >−≡ pwPwε  is the elasticity of the CPI with respect to the 
domestic product wage. It is obtained that, in the symmetric equilibrium 
)( ∗= tt , the CPI is [ ] bbbbDC tpp −−+−== 1 11)1( λλ , implying that 
DC ww > . This is so because decentralized unions do not take into account 
the positive effect that an increase in the wage rate has on union utility through 
a reduction in the CPI: the wage demand is lower than a centralized union, and 
consequently the employment level higher.  
If unions are centralized and cooperate at international level, they 
internalize the adverse effects of a wage increase on the unions’ utility abroad 
through the increase in the foreign CPI which causes, given the foreign 
product wage, a reduction in the consumption wage in that country. In 
equilibrium, this will cause a wage level which is lower than those fixed by 
centralized unions with an exclusively national viewpoint. It follows that 
international unions maximize  
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Hence, trade unions fix the wage following the condition 
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which becomes 
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where 0/ >≡ ∗∗∗ pPw wε  is the elasticity of the CPI with respect to the 
foreign product wage. In the symmetric equilibrium )( ∗= εε , it follows that 
IDC www => . This result corresponds to an international version of the 
original findings by Calmfors and Driffil (1988) of the hump-shaped 
relationship between wages and the degree of corporatism. 
Driffill and van der Ploeg (1993, footnote 2) show that national centralized 
unions have a utility level lower than decentralized and international unions; it 
follows that national unions could find profitable to cooperate across countries 
(improving their welfare) because of higher employment levels. However, 
decentralized unions could find advantageous to move from centralization 
towards decentralization of the wage setting; but if  wage arrangements in the 
foreign country are taken as given, it could be the case that decentralized 
unions would prefer a centralized wage setting. In other words, unions could 
face a classical Prisoners’ Dilemma.  
The effects of increasing economic integration (a reduction of ∗= tt ) are 
also considered. In case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is obtained that  
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where 0)( ' >−≡ QwQc  is the elasticity of production to product wage. 
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, the elasticity of the CPI with respect to home 
and foreign product wage is constant )( cλεε == ∗  and independent from 
tariffs. It is also derived that, in the symmetric equilibrium, 
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    (11) 
from which it can be noted that inefficiencies from the absence of 
international cooperation between unions (low output and employment levels) 
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are larger when the share of imported goods in total consumption is large and 
when the aggregate supply curve is very elastic. Instead, in case of CES 
preferences )1( >b , the authors show that for 1=e  and ∗= tt , 0<∂∂ tε : 
centralized unions set higher wages if tariffs and ε  are low, and consequently 
a further reduction in trade barriers deepens the wage differential between 
centralized setting and the other two settings. Nonetheless, the union utility as 
a whole decreases in case of centralized wage setting because the fall in 
employment level does not overcome gains from higher wage rates, and hence 
incentives for international cooperation between trade unions increase.   
Driffill and van der Ploeg (1995) face the same issues addressed in their 
previous work adopting a different setting; they show that the results strongly 
depend on the hypothesis lying behind the models. A two-country model of 
intra-industry trade in differentiated goods is used where in the product market 
monopolistic competitive firms operate. Firms freely enter and leave until 
profits are bid down to zero. The production function exhibits increasing 
returns to scale. Moreover, in this work, the authors consider a utilitarian 
monopoly trade union in an industry which represents a small fraction of the 
country GDP, and consequently a small part of the consumers’ budget. 
Therefore, differently from Driffill and van der Ploeg (1993), since the wage 
paid in the industry might have only a small effect on the CPI faced by its 
employees, a national union or even an international union would not be 
inclined to moderate its wage demands on that account. Under these 
conditions, the authors find that wages set at the national level positively 
depend upon the tariff level, explained by the fact that trade barriers protect 
national unions. Thus, tariff cuts oblige labor unions to set lower wages. Since 
the wage rates set internationally are substantially unaltered by the tariff, a fall 
in the tariffs themselves broadens the difference between the nationally and 
internationally negotiated wages, and hence to an increasing incentive for 
trans-national labor union cooperation. Moreover, the authors conclude that 
the national wage is always lower than the international wage, only 
approaching the latter when the tariff tends to infinity. The rationale is that 
with low tariffs, a small increase in the domestic wage, taking as given the 
wage in the other country, will cause a reduction in the number of firms in the 
domestic industry. Since numerous domestic firms will exit the industry while, 
at the same time, many firms will enter in the foreign country, the national 
union, taking this into account, select a very low wage. Instead, the 
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international union considers an overall wage rate increase and consequently 
perceives a less significant (total) employment effect of a wage raise. As a 
result, it sets a relatively high wage. 
Another class of works has considered the effects of economic integration 
in the context of international oligopoly (duopoly) models with unionized 
labor markets, in which firms and unions interact strategically. Generally, 
these are partial equilibrium models6 constructed taking in consideration a 
two-stage game structure solved in the backward fashion where:   
1) there is full unionization and monopoly unions in the first stage 
maximize their rents over competitive wage either competing à la Bertrand or 
colluding between them: in this case there is interdependency between the 
wage levels in different countries; otherwise, unions and firms bargain over 
wages: in this case wage levels are determined independently in each country; 
2) in the second stage firms choose the profit maximizing quantities (and 
hence employment) independently for each market (market segmentation), 
given the quantity of the other firm (Cournot competition assumption) and the 
wage resulting from the first stage (“right-to-manage”). 
While the bargaining approach is rarely used when economic integration is 
analyzed in international trade, the monopoly union model is more common 
given that it allows for labor markets rivalry. Normally, this approach adopts a 
number of simplifying assumptions regarding the demand function and 
production technology. In general, it is assumed linearity in demand and 
production functions of a homogeneous/differentiated commodity. Labor is 
usually the unique factor of production with constant return to scale, in such a 
way that each worker produces one unit of the goods: that is, production and 
employment are equal. The market segmentation hypothesis, combined with 
the constant marginal costs assumption, implies that, in each market, the price 
for the goods depends entirely on the quantity in that country. It is assumed 
that the sector is relatively small respect to the economy, such that the effects 
of wage negotiations on the general price level index are ignored. Moreover, 
only equilbria in pure strategies are considered. This kind of approach is found 
in Naylor (1998, 1999), Straume (2002), Piperakis et al. (2003) and Strozzi 
(2007, 2008). 
                                                 
6 The papers of Dube and Reddy (2006) and Bastos and Kreickmeier (2009) represent few 
exceptions of general equilibrium models in an international trade context. 
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A formal model that sums up this strand of the literature could be 
represented by the following framework. There are two countries (1 and 2), 
which have different market sizes ( 1s  and 2s ). In each country operates a 
firm. Should firms want to export, they pay a variable “per unit” cost [0,1)t∈  
representing a basket of costs including tariffs, transaction, transportation and 
logistic. Economic integration within this framework is pictured as a marginal 
reduction in t , and it is assumed that its value is sufficiently low so that both 
firms can export. The two-stage game is solved by backward induction as 
usual. To lighten notation, the different markets are denoted by the indices i  
and j  ( jiji ≠= ;2,1, ). It follows that firm profits are given by: 
ijiijiiiiii xtwpxwp )()( −−+−=Π                                                (12) 
where iip  is the prices of commodities in the domestic market and ijp  is 
the price for products in the foreign market, iw  is the wages paid by the firm i
, iix  is the firm i ’s production for consumption in its domestic market while 
ijx  is the production for consumption in the foreign market. Inverse product 
demands are linear and take the following form 
( ) ; ( )ii ii ji ij ij jj
i j
b bp a x x p a x x
s s
γ γ= − + = − +    (13) 
with 0, >ba , and where γ  is the parameter which captures the degree of 
differentiation among goods ix  and jx . In general, it is assumed that products 
are substitutes, implying that ( ]1,0∈γ : if 0γ → , the goods are substantially 
independent; if 1γ = , they are perfect substitutes. Thus, when international 
trade occurs, this is of intra-industry type: in fact, depending on the specific 
models’ assumptions, there are threshold values of t  such that autarky 
(defined as a situation where a firm produces only for its domestic market) 
arises as game equilibrium. Union utility is given by the following version of a 
Stone-Geary utility function    
))(( ijiiii xxwwU +−=                                                                        (14) 
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where w  is the reservation wage. In the second stage, Cournot competition 
in the product market takes place. Substituting equations (13) into (12), from 
the firms’ maximization problem (subject to the non-negative constraints), the 
following optimal quantities (employment levels) are obtained 
)4(
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γγγ
−
−++−=
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wtwaas
x jiiii       (15) 
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The sum of the two labor demand schedules given by (15) and (16) 
represents the aggregate demand faced by union i . In the first stage, unions set 
their wage, taking as given the wage level in the other country. Substituting in 
(14) the optimal quantities, the union i  maximization problem becomes 
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The maximization problem leads to an expression for union i  reaction 
function from which it is derived the equilibrium wage level in each country, 
given by 
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Equation (17) indicates that the wage in equilibrium presents a rent over the 
competitive level composed of two parts. The first term, the “product 
differentiation effect”, depends exclusively on the parameter γ , and it is 
unequivocally positive. The second term, “the market size effects”, may be 
either positive or negative. Economic integration (measured by the parameter 
t ) plays a role exclusively on the second term of the rent expression. From 
equation (17), it is directly derived 
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Equations (18) allow to draw some results: closer economic integration 
may have a positive or negative effect on wage levels, depending both on 
market sizes and product differentiation. If goods are perfect substitutes 
)1( =γ , the results of Piperakis et al. (2003) are obtained, according to whom 
if market size disparity is ji ss 5.3<  and if trade costs are below a certain 
threshold, increasing economic integration (a reduction of t ) leads union i  to 
increase wage demands. This is so because total employment in country i  
)( ijii xx +  increases. If market size disparities are too large ( ji ss 5.3> ), the 
reverse applies. What is the role played by product market differentiation? As 
long as γ  approaches to zero, the right-hand sides of the inequalities increase, 
implying that economic integration leads unions to increase wage demands 
even if product markets have huge size differences. It follows that, if countries 
are specialized in production of relatively different goods, labor unions 
operating in larger countries should not be worried of increasing integration.7  
The previous results integrate those of Naylor (1998). Assuming symmetric 
countries and perfect substitutes (that is, 1=== γji ss ), Naylor obtains 
that for levels of t  allowing for intra-industry trade )311.0( ≤≤ t , 
0/ <∂∂ twi : an increase in economic integration will induce trade unions to 
set unambiguously higher wages. The reason is that when trade cost level 
decreases, a more severe competition amongst the participants in an 
international oligopoly takes place. Nonetheless, the firms’ output increases: 
gains from more sales in the foreign markets counterbalance the disadvantage 
of higher competition in the home market. In this framework, labor demand 
becomes less elastic: even if a smaller number of workers are needed to satisfy 
domestic demand, firms require more workers to produce goods for export. 
                                                 
7 Piperakis et al. (2003, Appendix) show that, if trade costs are above a threshold value, an 
increase in employment opportunities due to trade is not sufficient for the union in the larger 
market to equalize the utility loss due to a lower wage. Instead, the union in the smaller country 
finds always profitable to set a low wage assuring an employment compensation from the access 
in to the larger market. This a notable difference respect to symmetric models of intra-industry 
trade: when market sizes are asymmetric, autarky may arise in equilibrium only in one country. 
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Given that the latter effect is larger than the former, when intra industry trade 
takes place, employment grows due to the output expansion; and while firms 
may possibly suffer a loss in profits, unions will choose to set higher wages. 
Consequently, it is found that 0/ <∂∂ tUi : further economic integration 
causes an unambiguous increase in labor unions’ utilities due to a 
simultaneous raise in total employment and wage rates.  
In a subsequent work, Naylor (1999) extends his previous analysis to a 
more general framework, encompassing the Brander and Spencer (1988) 
model which considers the case of only one labor market unionized. It 
characterizes a full set of possible trade regimes in a two-country duopoly 
model with a homogeneous product and one union active in each labor market. 
The author takes in consideration the outcomes of two alternative union wage 
strategies. Naylor (1999) defines as a low-wage strategy a union wage setting 
such that both domestic production and exports are strictly positive. Instead, 
the high-wage strategy implies that a union set a wage level precluding 
exports. The main results are as follows: 1) where only one market is 
unionized, one-way trade occurs if union chooses a high wage, which depends 
on the exogenous rival wage and trade cost levels; when trade costs decreases, 
two-way trade arises; 2) in a symmetric unionized framework, intra-industry 
trade arises as equilibrium if trade costs are below a certain threshold values 
)311.0( ≤≤ t ; in that range increasing economic integration leads unions to 
set high wages, and their utility raises as trade costs fall; for sufficiently high 
trade costs )354.( ≥t , the autarky equilibrium arises; in an intermediate 
range )354.311(. << t  equilibrium in pure strategies is not existent; 3) 
when trade costs are sufficiently low )163.0( << t , the intra-industry trade 
equilibrium Pareto-dominates the collusive outcome: unions jointly get a 
higher level of utility allowing for international trade. For higher levels of 
trade costs )311.163(. ≤≤ t , the union game presents the characteristics of 
a classical Prisoners’ Dilemma where the collusive outcome Pareto-dominates 
the Nash equilibrium. Thus, there are incentives for unions to collude 
internationally. 
Naylor (2000) extends the analysis of Naylor (1998, 1999). This model 
differs from the previous in that the home country is unionized, and the 
domestic monopoly union takes the foreign wage as given when set its own 
wage. It is assumed that the wage rate in the home country is higher than the 
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wage paid abroad. Labor is the unique factor of production with the usual 
assumption of constant marginal productivity. The model is a two-stage game, 
solved in the usual backward fashion. In the first stage, the domestic union set 
wages maximizing the following utility function 
iii lwwU
θ)( −=  
where iii xl =  in case of no trade or one-way trade, and ijiii xxl +=  in 
case of two-way trade,  deciding among the high/low-wage strategies. In the 
second stage, differently from Naylor (1998, 1999), firms compete according 
to a conjectural variation model in the product market. The degree of market 
substitutability among goods is captured by the parameter γ  in equation (13), 
whose range in this model is [ 1,1]γ ∈ − : if 1−=γ , the goods are 
complements. Depending on the trade cost level, no trade, one-way trade or 
two-way trade occurs in equilibrium. In the presence of high trade costs, 
neither the domestic nor the foreign firm undertake international trade. If trade 
costs decrease, one-way trade take place. This is because the foreign firm pays 
lower wages, and if trade costs are symmetric, exports are profitable only for 
the foreign firm. In a situation where trade costs are so high such that only 
one-way trade occurs, a decrease in trade costs leads the domestic union to 
reduce wage demands if goods are substitutes because of increasing 
international competition, while wages are increasing if goods are 
complements. Two-way trade takes place if trade costs further reduce. The key 
result is that now the domestic union increases wage demands independently 
from the degree of market substitutability among traded goods. However, the 
selection among the high/low-wage strategies does not exclusively depend on 
the trade regime. Although the strategic wage rate’s choice depends on trade 
costs levels, it turns out these costs are affected by the degree of product 
market competition between firms, the level of product differentiation, the 
reservation wage and the weight assigned to the wage in the union preference. 
To sum up, Naylor’s works show that a marginal decrease in trade costs 
can increase wages even in such cases where reciprocal trade was already 
occurring previously to the reduction in trade barriers. Thus, in Naylor’s 
models the market expansion effect of increasing integration dominates the 
market discipline effect. However, wages under autarky are always higher than 
with reciprocal trade. High trade costs induce unions to choose a high-wage 
strategy, and for certain ranges, only one-way trade occurs. If trade costs fall 
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below a critical threshold, unions switch their wage strategy towards a low-
wage profile, and a further marginal decline in trade costs will increase wage 
rates. 
Bastos and al. (2009), using an international duopoly model with only one 
country unionized, investigate the effects of the process of trade liberalization 
on collective bargaining outcomes when workers are represented by open shop 
unions. Product markets are supposed to be segmented, and union density in 
this model is exogenously given. The authors find that, when the union’s 
density degree is at intermediate levels, higher wages may be negotiated in 
case of trade liberalization, even if no trade occurs in equilibrium. The reason 
for this result is that, under certain conditions, the prospects of imports from a 
foreign country in case of bargaining breakdown with unions will affect the 
firms’ conflict payoff. Therefore, the “import threat” due to international 
competition improves the union position during negotiations and weakens the 
position of the domestic firm. Hence, the firm will accept higher union wage 
claims in the presence of strong international competition. Moreover, they are 
able to show that union wages might be higher with free trade than in autarky. 
An extension of Naylor’s (1998, 1999) analysis is represented by the work 
of Gürtzgen (2002). The framework is different: in her international unionized 
duopoly model with differentiated products,  market competition takes place à 
la Bertrand. The author studies national labor markets interdependencies and 
the consequences of trade liberalization for union wages. Her analysis suggests 
that national wages are expected to be strategic complements (substitutes) if 
products are ordinary substitutes (complements). The main results are as 
follows. Bilateral trade liberalization always leads unions to set higher wages, 
increasing their utilities regardless of the nature of product rivalry: this result 
substantially confirms Naylor’s findings. As regards unilateral liberalization, 
whereas foreign tariff reductions always leads to higher union wages and 
utilities, the impact on wages and union utility of a decrease in the domestic 
tariff depends on the nature of product rivalry. 
Scope for unions to adopt the collusive behavior within the context of a 
duopoly international trade game and conditions for collusive behavior to be 
supported as equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game framework are deeply 
analyzed in the works of Straume (2002) and Strozzi (2007, 2008). Both works 
are constructed upon the basic analytical framework of Naylor (1999) 
considering a two-stage game, two symmetric countries duopoly model with 
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reciprocal dumping. Monopoly unions are first movers and in the first stage of 
the game set wages, while firms determine their production taking wages as 
given. While Straume (2002) investigates the case of perfect substitute goods, 
Strozzi (2007, 2008) encompasses these works introducing into the analysis a 
degree of complementary/substitutability between products. Depending on the 
high-low union wage strategy, different trade regimes are possible. 
Additionally, Strozzi (2007) considers two alternative unions’ strategies in 
case of deviation from transnational collusion: a deviation strategy where the 
chosen wage is such that still allows for intra-industry trade (mild deviation); 
and a wage strategy such that the selected wage is so low as to induce the exit 
of the foreign firm from the domestic market (harsh deviation). A general 
result is that unions select the low-wage strategy when trade costs are 
relatively low while they choose the high-wage strategy when these are 
sufficiently high.  
In a repeated framework, unions are supposed to play a “trigger strategy”, 
namely a strategy characterized by the Nash reversion to the competitive 
equilibrium whenever there is a deviation from the collusive wage-setting, 
although this is not the optimal form of punishment. The collusive agreement 
between unions is sustainable if it is supported by some realistic threats, such 
that the one-period gain from cheating will be lower than the discounted 
expected value from punishment. The discounted factor is identical for both 
unions. The trigger strategy constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the 
infinitely repeated game when the following condition is satisfied  
PDC UUU δ
δ
δ −+≥− 11
1
      
where CU  is the utility level from collusion, DU  is the utility level from 
the one-period defection and PU  the utility derived from punishment, which 
happens if  
PD
CD
UU
UU
−
−≥δ         (19) 
The choice of the optimal collusive wage strategy depends on trade barriers 
and the possibility of firm collusion: in a repeated game framework, also firms 
have incentives to reach a collusive agreement assuring autarky. Using (12) 
and (13) (with 1==== ji ssba ), and substituting the Cournot quantities 
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obtained from profit maximization into (14) (with 0w = ), the equilibrium 
wage in the union game is derived  
)4(2
224
γ
γγ
−
+−−= ttwIIT        (20) 
with 0/ <∂∂ twIIT , since (0,1]γ ∈ . Further substitution of (20) into the 
union utility function yields  
2
2
)4)(2(
)2)(2(
γγ
γ
−+
−−= tU IIT        (21) 
when both unions adopt a low-wage strategy allowing for intra-industry 
trade. Instead, if unions choose a high-wage strategy inducing only domestic 
production, it is obtained that in equilibrium 
2
1=Auw  and 8
1=AuU .       (22) 
If union j  plays the low-wage strategy, union i  may respond playing 
either the low-wage strategy, allowing for intra-industry trade, or the high-
wage strategy, which will end with one-way trade. Union i  will select the low-
wage strategy as long as )()( jLiHjLiL wUwU > . Instead, if union j  chooses 
a high-wage strategy, union i  may select either the low-wage strategy, which 
leads to one-way trade, or the high-wage strategy, inducing autarky. In this 
case, union i  plays the high-wage strategy in response to the rival union high-
wage strategy as long as )()( jHiLjHiH wUwU > . This yields to calculate the 
critical thresholds values of trade costs in determining the union strategy. Each 
union selects the low-wage strategy if 
28(2 )[(1 2) ( 6 4 2 8 2)]t γ γ γ γ≤ − − − + − : evaluated at 1=γ  (perfect 
substitutes) gives 311.≤t , the result obtained in Naylor (1999). Instead, a 
union chooses a high-wage strategy if  2 2 42 1 4( 32 12 )t γ γ γ γ> − + + − +
: evaluated at 1=γ  gives 354.≥t , the result obtained in Naylor (1999).  
In case of  firms’ collusion, when unions fix the collusive wage and play a 
low-wage strategy, the wage rate and the utility level are given by 
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in the range )1034(7410 +≤< t , and  
twCIIT 4
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in the range γ+−≤<+ 22)1034(741 t . In the first range, the 
wage level depend on trade costs and the degree of product differentiation. 
Strozzi shows that a reduction in t  increases the wage rate when traded goods 
are relatively well differentiated, while it decreases it when traded products are 
similar and trade costs relatively high. The reason for this result is due to the 
fact that a decrease in t  has two effects on firm profits working in opposite 
directions: a negative, indirect effect due to a reduction in prices, and a 
positive, direct effect due to a reduction in costs. Instead, in the second range 
0/ <∂∂ twCIIT : a reduction in t  unambiguously raises the collusive wage. 
Conversely, for γ+−> 22t , unions play the high-wage strategy. Hence, 
firms are induced to produce only for the domestic market: the autarky regime 
arises. These findings are obtained for the case of perfect substitute goods also 
in Straume (2002). However, in the presence of intra-industry trade with firms’ 
incentives to collude, collusion unambiguously Pareto-dominates separate 
wage setting from the unions’ viewpoint only when traded products are 
intermediate or high substitutes.  
A number of results arise from the analysis. First, the presence of union 
collusion across borders makes intra-industry trade more likely when traded 
goods are well differentiated. This could be seen differentiating the limit of 
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trade costs, which yields (2 2 ) 0d dγ γ− + < : that is, the range of trade 
costs assuring intra-industry trade under union collusion is wider with 
differentiated goods. This occurs because the lower is the degree of 
substitutability, the lower in each country is the responsiveness of consumer 
demand to the relative prices of traded goods. The intuition is that, due to the 
presence of trade costs, foreign market penetration is rather more difficult 
when traded products are similar than when they are relatively well 
differentiated.  
Second, considering the two unions’ deviations strategies from the 
transnational collusive agreement, Strozzi (2007) shows that in the presence of 
intra-industry trade between countries, a cheating union always prefers to fix a 
wage level which prevents exports from the foreign firm. The only exception 
is when traded goods are similar and international product markets not 
relatively well integrated: in such a case, the optimal deviation strategy is to 
set a wage rate allowing intra-industry trade. This is so because the sensitivity 
of consumer demand to relative prices is rather low when traded products are 
differentiated enough: the deviating union finds more advantageous to set a 
relatively low wage rate and completely monopolize the domestic market. At 
the same time, when traded goods are close substitutes and in the presence of 
relatively high trade costs, a cheating union prefers to set a relatively high 
wage, inducing intra-industry trade: trade cost levels plays an increasing role 
in consumer demand when this is more responsive to relative prices. 
Third, making use of the union payoffs under different strategies and (19), 
it is shown that, in the presence of intra-industry trade, the sustainability of 
collusion among unions depends both on the degrees of international product 
market integration and substitutability between traded goods. If trade barriers 
are relatively low, collusion is more difficult to be sustained the more 
integrated are product markets and the less similar are traded products: a 
reduction in t  makes deviation an increasingly attractive option for unions. 
This is because economic integration increases the short-run gains from 
exports while the long-run punishment is not sufficiently harsh to avoid 
deviation. Moreover, for lower degrees of product differentiation a deviation is 
comparatively more profitable from the unions’ point of view: the 
responsiveness of consumer demand to relative prices is smaller when product 
differentiation degree is relatively low. This implies that only a small 
reduction in wages is needed to assure a monopoly position in the domestic 
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market. In addition, for relatively low degrees of product differentiation, the 
difference between union welfare under collusion and Nash reversion is 
comparatively smaller than in the case of perfect substitutes. 
Fourth, in the presence of intra-industry trade, trade liberalization does not 
affect the sustainability of union collusion when traded goods are sufficiently 
similar and trade costs relatively high: in this case collusion is easier the less 
similar are traded goods. The rationale resides in the fact that product 
differentiation reduces unions’ welfare gains by defecting the collusive 
agreement: since it is difficult for a single firm to gain the rivals’ market share 
in the presence of sufficiently differentiated traded products, deviation is not 
beneficial from the single union’s point of  view.  
Summarizing, the impact of international product market integration on 
unions’ willingness to adopt collusive behavior depends both on the degree of 
product market integration (measured by the trade cost level) and the relative 
substitutability among traded products. In particular, if countries are 
symmetric and trade cost levels are low enough, an increase in international 
product market integration makes transnational collusion among unions more 
difficult. At the same time, collusion in wage rates is easier when traded goods 
are similar. 
The effects of product market integration on wage bargaining institutions is 
the subject of Santoni (2009). The work starts with an empirical analysis 
where it is found a negative relation between increasing market integration 
(measured by reduction in trade costs) and the level of bargaining. Then, the 
author constructs a theoretical one-country model to investigate how import 
competition affects the degree of centralization (and, therefore, the degree of 
unions’ cooperation and firms’ cooperation) in wage negotiations at the 
industry level. This work mainly differs from those of Driffill and van der 
Ploeg (1993, 1995) in the fact that the degree of bargaining centralization is 
endogenously determined. Product market is characterized by an unionized 
Cournot triopoly with linear demand functions and constant marginal costs, 
where two unionized domestic firms compete with a non-unionized foreign 
firm. The structure of the model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, for a 
given level of trade costs, the two unions and firms decide if bargaining should 
be conducted at decentralized/ centralized level, coordinating their activities; 
in case of coordination, both unions and firms incur a fix transaction cost. In 
the second stage, given the bargaining institution, rent maximizing unions and 
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firms negotiate over wages. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is 
adopted, where the bargaining power is assumed to be symmetric across 
unions and firms, but different between unions and firms. In the last stage of 
the game, given the negotiated wages, domestic firms engage in product 
competition in the domestic market with the foreign firm.  
The initial point of the analysis is a one-way trade for different degrees of 
product differentiation. In the case of substitute goods, two wage bargaining 
regimes arise as equilibrium: 1) full decentralization, that is, each union-firm 
pair bargains over wages separately; and 2) union centralization, that is, an 
industry-wide union negotiates the wage rate with the two firms. The  
bargaining regime arising in equilibrium depends on the tradeoff between 
unions’ utility gains from centralization (which in turn is related to the relative 
union strength in bargaining, the degree of product substitutability and the 
generated domestic oligopoly rents), and the fixed costs of coordinating 
bargaining activities. Product market integration will make full 
decentralization a more likely outcome. This is so because lower domestic 
oligopoly rents cause to be less credible the commitment by domestic unions 
to higher wages deriving from the internalization of employment externalities: 
bargaining centralization is too costly in terms of employment losses. As 
regards firms, their preference is toward full decentralization. The reverse 
holds in case of complement goods: unions prefer a separate wage bargaining 
while firms prefer to centralize it. Once again, two wage bargaining regimes 
arises in equilibrium: 1) full centralization, that is, an industry-wide union 
negotiates over wages with an employers’ association; and 2) firm 
centralization, that is, an employers’ association bargains over wages with the 
two decentralized unions. In the presence of complement goods, increasing 
integration implies not only import penetration, but also increasing market 
rents for domestic firms. A similar situation arises in case of two-way trade in 
homogeneous goods: union centralization increases wages as well as market 
rents. In conclusion, product market integration has not a univocal effect on 
the degree of centralization at which negotiations will take place at the 
industry level: the market structure and the degree of product differentiation 
play an important role in determining the bargaining regime in equilibrium. 
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B. Labor unions and trade liberalization: integration of markets 
Another way to model trade liberalization is the method used by Huizinga 
(1993), Sørensen (1993), and Kikuchi and Amegashie (2003). In these models, 
economic integration is a discrete process with countries passing from autarky 
to complete product market integration.  
In Huizinga (1993) and Sørensen (1993), two distinct markets consisting of 
single union-firm bargaining units merge into a fully integrated product market 
for the homogeneous goods with two bargaining units. Both models assume 
linearity in demand and production functions, with labor the only productive 
factor, and the absence of transportation or trade costs to sell the goods in the 
market. Another common feature is the structure of the model. This is a two-
stage game solved by backward induction: wages are firstly fixed, and 
subsequently firms, taking wage rates as given, decide their production levels. 
Pre-integration wages are determined according to 
αα
ii
w
i Uw
i
−Π= 1maxarg          (27) 
with 2,1=i , where iiii xwp )( −=Π  is the firm profit function, ix  is 
labor, iii bxaxp −=)(  is the price of the goods before integration, iU  is 
the union utility, and α  is the union’s bargaining power. While Huizinga 
(1993) uses a union utility function as in (14) assuming monopoly unions         
( 0=jx  because each firm produces only for its domestic market before 
integration), Sørensen (1993) assuming a right-to-manage model uses an 
expected-utility function of this form 
1−−+=
l
xlw
l
xU iiii  
where l  is the total labor force in the country, ix  are unionized workers 
and 1 is the reservation wage. After integration, the two markets merge. As a 
consequence, the two firms start competing in a Cournot fashion in the product 
market. The price in the integrated market becomes bqaqp −=)( , with 
)( 21 xxq += ; firm profits now are iii xwqp ))(( −=Π . In the first stage, 
unions maximize their utility function subject to the new labor demand 
schedule.   
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Despite the differences between the two models, the conclusions are 
analogous: product market integration leads to a market size’s enlargement, 
and in an increase in the number of the firms operating in the market, 
intensifying competition. This in turns implies a drop in prices and wage 
levels. Moreover, Huizinga (1993) gets that the wage reduction is more than 
offset by the increase in employment, so that net union utility increases. Thus, 
international integration is welfare enhancing from the unions’ point of view.  
Kikuchi and Amegashie (2003) focus on trade liberalization effects when 
the two economies are asymmetric. They assume that, in one country, there are 
few firms than in the other. In each country, an industry-wide union sets wages 
maximizing rents; firms choose employment. Product market competition is à 
la Cournot. The authors show that, in the absence of international trade, wages 
in the two countries do not depend on the number of firms, but prices in the 
small country are higher because market competition takes place among few 
firms. When trade liberalization occurs, the two markets become integrated, 
and all firms compete in the unique market. The effect on wages in the small 
country is that now their level is lower than in the large country: lower 
employment makes the union in the small country more responsive to 
competition disadvantages, reducing wages more. It follows that, depending 
on the market size differences among the two countries, it may be that the 
small country with a previous high price becomes a net exporter after the 
liberalization.  
Nonetheless, these models do not consider any interaction between the two 
economies before integration occurs.8 The incentives for international 
cooperation between labor unions are only briefly sketched: in particular, 
Huizinga (1993) concisely discusses the effects of “wage harmonization” by 
unions after that the two firms begin to compete in the integrated market. 
Wage harmonization leads unions to set wages at a level equal to that of pre-
integration. It follows that union utility increases due to higher employment 
levels at the higher pre-integration wage rate. 
Incentives for labor union cooperation in a context of integrated product 
markets are deeply explored in Borghijs and Du Caju (1999). The model has a 
basic set up. There is a single firm with two plants located in different 
countries. In each country, a labor union is active. The goods are sold in the 
                                                 
8 Munch and Sørensen (2000) and Munch and Skaksen (2002) use a different approach that tries 
to encompass the two integration measures above described. 
ECONÓMICA 
 
56
integrated market without any extra cost of transportation. Unions have to pay 
some exogenous transaction costs to coordinate wage demands (collusive 
behavior) at trans-national level. The model is a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, monopoly unions (workers are fully unionized) maximize their rents 
over the competitive wage. In the second stage, the firm allocates optimally 
production, taking as given the wages set by unions. The inverse demand 
function for the integrated market is linear. Total output is produced by a 
single firm characterized by a decreasing return to scale technology in the 
single input, namely labor, given by ii lx = , with 2,1=i  denoting the two 
countries. The firm’s maximization problem is 
2
22
2
112121 ))](([ xwxwxxxxba −−++−=Π , 
from which it is obtained 0<∂∂ ii wl , 0>∂∂ ji wl , with 
, 1, 2;i j i j= ≠ : that is, the employment level in each plant depends 
negatively on its own wage and positively on the wage level in the other plant. 
It follows that if one union demands a wage rate too high, production is shifted 
to the other plant and then imported without extra costs. Two different wage 
settings are compared in the first stage: a separate setting, where each union 
fixes its on wage level competing against the other plant level union; and a 
collusive setting, where unions choose the common wage rate that maximizes 
their joint utility. With these assumptions, the union rent in equation (14) 
becomes 
))(( 2iii xwwU −=             (28
in case of separate setting, and 
))(( 22
2
1 xxwwU cc +−−= τ        (29) 
in case of collusive behavior, where τ  is the cost of coordinating union 
activities. From maximization of (28), the F.O.C. in case of separate wage 
setting yields 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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j
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         (30) 
while the collusive wage obtained from (29) is 
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)(2
_ τ++= bwwc .       (31) 
The main results are as follows. For coordination costs high enough, unions 
act as competitors on the labor market. Thus, they moderate their wage 
demands. Below the threshold value of transaction costs 
_ _ _
2
_ _
[ 2 ( 2 )]
4 ( 2 )
w b w w b
w w b
τ∧ + − +=
+
                  (32) 
to cooperate turns out to be increasingly attractive for unions, which 
translates in a raise in wages and utilities. Further decreases in the value of τ  
reduce wages; but the collusive wage is higher than the competitive one. 
Hence, by means of coordinated wage demands, labor unions can improve 
their position in negotiations with employers; that is, coordination provides a 
countervailing power to the impact of economic integration. Intuitively, in 
open economies high wage claims by individual unions lead to a decrease in 
competitiveness related to nearest countries. This is considered only when 
determining their own wage claim, without considering the positive spillover 
effects on the competitive position of other countries. Therefore, each union 
tends to moderate wages. In contrast, with a coordinated action, individual 
trade unions will consider this positive spillover effect of high wage demands 
on other countries. As a result, the joint initiative by trade unions increases the 
wage demand compared to decentralization. Hence, staying at the results of the 
model, incentives for unions to coordinate their activities across boundaries 
seem to exist also when production activities are spread over different 
countries. 
4. International production in unionized countries 
The interaction among unionized labor markets and the activities linked to 
internationalization of production by firms, principally (but not exclusively) 
through FDI, has received in recent years an increasing attention.9 A consistent 
                                                 
9 Internationalization of productive activities can take forms diverse from FDI, like international 
outsourcing. Differently from FDI, international outsourcing does not imply that a firm invests 
in production capacities overseas. In fact, outsourcing is defined as a shift in control over 
production by means of contracts with non-affiliate firms, which develop for the contractor 
either part of existing productive processes or completely new activities. This kind of 
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body of studies in the economic literature explored the effect that unionized 
labor markets and their bargaining structures, as well as decreasing trade costs 
and competition from a non-unionized countries have in the strategic decision 
by MNE to enter in a market via green-field FDI,10 alternatively or 
concurrently to export penetration.11 These works developed either one-
country set up (Bughin and Vannini, 1995, 2003; Leahy and Montagna, 2000; 
Skaksen and Sørensen, 2001; Mukherjee and Suetrong, 2007; Mukherjee, 
2008; Mukherjee and Marjit, 2009), or two-country models; these are 
characterized either by an international oligopoly (Zhao 1995, 1998; 
Lommerud et al., 2003; Naylor and Santoni, 2003; Glass and Saggi, 2005; 
Ishida and Matsushima 2005, 2009) or the presence of a mass of 
monopolistically competitive firms in the product market (Eckel and Egger, 
2009). Nonetheless, these models have some common features. Because of 
                                                                                                                     
internationalization of production also has implications for unionized labor. On this issue, see 
the theoretical contributions of Zhao (2001), Skaksen (2004), Lommerud et al. (2009), Koskela 
and Stenbacka (2009, 2010), Zhao and Okamura (2010), König and Koskela (2011) and Rocha-
Akis and Schöb (2011). See Kramarz (2004, 2008) in French manufacturing industries based on 
firm-level micro data, and Moreno and Rodriguez (2010) for Spain for the empirical analysis of 
the direct effects of outsourcing on unionized labor. 
10 The OECD definition of FDI is: “FDI reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a 
resident entity in one economy (“direct investor”), in an entity resident in an economy other than 
that of the investor (“direct investor enterprise”). It can cover the transfer of ownership, but also 
equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital (e.g. loans)”. Hence, FDI is a term that covers a 
wide range of international capital movements, including inter-company loans, mergers& 
acquisition (M&A), and the establishment or expansion of foreign production sites, namely 
green-field FDI). This review limits the analysis to the effects of green-field FDI on unionized 
labor. However, within the process of economic integration, the liberalization of capital markets 
has involved a higher degree of openness in the market for corporate control. Since the late 
1980s and all over the second half of the 1990s, international M&A represented a main form of  
FDI, especially in advanced economies. The fraction of cross border M&A has constantly 
increased, reaching in recent times significant figures. According to UNCTAD (2000, 2002, 
2004, 2009), the whole value of worldwide cross-border M&A in 1999 added up to more than 
80% of world FDI flows, and the share of international M&A was almost 31%. In 2008, despite 
the international financial crisis, the share of international M&A still represented almost 73% of 
world FDI inflows and 64.5% of world FDI outflows. The interested readers on the 
consequences of  cross-border M&A on unionized labor markets are referred to the 
contributions of Straume (2003), Lommerud et al. (2005, 2006, 2008), Mukherjee and Zhao 
(2007), and Mesa-Sánchez (2010). 
11 Aloi et al. (2009) and Boulhol (2009) analyze in two-country models the effects of capital 
flows on unionized labor market using a broader concept of capital market integration.  
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space limitations, not all of them are explored in depth, the choice of which is 
based solely on a decision to focus on their results. The framework is either a 
two or a three-stage game  where:  
1) at the first stage, the firm chooses whether to undertake FDI (a 
production facilities located in a host country), or to export their goods; or, 
alternatively, whether to invest in a foreign country; 
2) depending on the hypothesis related to the scope of the bargaining, in the 
subsequent stages wages and employment are determined. In case of efficient 
bargaining, in the second and last stage of the game firms and unions 
simultaneously decide wage rates and employment; with a right-to-manage 
approach, in the second stage firms and unions bargain only over wages and 
then firms determine autonomously their production (and hence employment) 
levels.  
Respect to models analyzing international trade, the bargaining approach in 
the wage determination is widely used in this literature, focusing on national 
wage bargaining rather than on the strategic interactions among unions in labor 
markets. The resulting wage derives from the relative bargaining power by 
national unions and their preferences over wage and employment. A direct 
consequence is that the cited contributions consider neither international labor 
market rivalry nor the possibility of transnational union cooperation. Union 
coordination may occur only at national level.  
Bughin and Vannini (1995) and Zhao (1995) are pioneering works on the 
effects that unionization has on MNE decisions related to their production 
activities. Bughin and Vannini (1995) examine the strategic investment by a 
MNE in a host country in the presence of unemployment generated by union’ 
bargaining power in wage negotiations. This is so because aggregate labor 
supply is exogenous and constant. Workers’ mobility among firms in the 
relevant sector characterizes the labor market. This implies that also the 
competitive wage in the host country, which represents the “threat point” 
during the bargaining process, is endogenously determined. It is assumed that 
two firms, a local firm and a MNE, compete à la Cournot in the product 
market for homogeneous goods. The MNE chooses how to serve the relevant 
market: via export or building up a plant in the host country paying some fixed 
costs. Then, wage negotiations occur. Finally, production outcomes are 
realized. The model is solved in the usual backward fashion. If the MNE 
serves the host country market through exports, the union takes its wage rate 
ECONÓMICA 
 
60
as exogenous during the negotiation. In case of FDI, the authors make a 
distinction among two sub-cases. With full unionization, the local firm and the 
MNE are both unionized; with partial unionization, only the local producer is 
unionized while the MNE pays the competitive wage. In case of partial 
unionization, the labor demand of the MNE influences the competitive wage in 
the host country and, consequently, also the union threat point during wage 
negotiations is affected. Given this framework, the authors show that FDI 
lowers the host country’s welfare. Unionized workers are indifferent between a 
MNE producing in the foreign country and exporting the goods to the host 
country or producing in the host country and being unionized. With an 
unionized MNE, host country’s unemployment is unaffected. However, if the 
MNE produces locally and is not unionized, the host country’s labor demand 
increases, unemployment decreases and the competitive wages paid by the 
MNE will reduce. As a consequence, the threat point of the union during 
negotiations is lowered. While full unionization deters the MNE in 
undertaking FDI, partial unionization boosts the incentive for FDI since union 
power in the rival’s firm creates unemployment, and this lowers the 
competitive wage for the MNE, creating a cost advantage at the expense of the 
local producer. 
Zhao (1995) investigates how unionization of labor markets may affect the 
strategic choice by firms concerning the start of international business. This 
author constructs a partial equilibrium model of intra-industry cross-hauling 
(that is, reciprocal) FDI with unionized duopoly and integrated product 
markets. The model presents a two-stage game structure: in the first, firms 
choose independently whether they want to invest abroad; in the second, firms 
and national labor unions negotiate for wages and employment through an 
efficient Nash bargaining. The production function shows constant returns to 
scale, such that employment and production are exactly the same. In the two 
countries, the same technology is available. There are zero transportation costs 
across them. There might be trade, but this is not of intra-industry type since 
products are sold in one international integrated market. In the benchmark 
case, involving unionized labor markets without FDI, the profit for each firm 
equals qwp )( −=Π , with yxq ,=  the two homogeneous goods and 
)( yxpp +=  the inverse world demand function, with 0' <p . Union 
utility is given by the following Stone-Geary function 
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γθ qwwqwU )(),( −=      
representing a more general expression of (14). w  is the reservation wage 
(equal across countries), )( ww −  is the excess wage; θ  and γ  are the 
elasticity of union utility to the rent over the reservation wage and 
employment, respectively. The union is wage (employment) oriented if 
γθ >  ( γθ < ), neutrally oriented when γθ = . Assuming that in case of 
disagreement both parties’ fallback positions equal to zero, the generalized 
Nash product in each country is 
ααγθ −−−= 1])[(])[(),( qwpqwwqwG                   (33) 
where 0≥α  is the relative bargaining power of the union. This game is 
solved by choosing w  and q  such that (.)G is maximized. It is obtained 
(imposing symmetry in F.O.C.) 
wggpw )1( −+=         (34) 
')1( qpkkpw −+=         (35) 
where 0)1( ≥−+= ααθαθg , 1)1( ≤−+= ααγαγk , and p  
is the relevant demand, namely the residual demand for each country. For 
example, if x  is home production, then  )(
_
yxpp += , where _y  is the 
production level from bargaining in the foreign country. Total differentiation 
of the profit function and union utility leads to the contract curve for each 
country  
qppwww ')( −−=−θ
γ
       (36) 
Differentiation of (36) gives the slope of the contract curve 
γθθγ )(0)(1
2 ''' ><<>−
+= ifqpp
dq
dw
  
Conditions (34) and (36) determine the equilibrium wage. If the union is 
employment (wage) oriented, the contract curve is positively (negatively) 
sloped, and the equilibrium will be with low (high) wages and high (low) 
employment levels. Except for the cases that the union is neither with 
ECONÓMICA 
 
62
bargaining power ( 0=α ) nor interested in wage rents ( 0=θ ), the wage 
outcome lies always above the reservation wage and decreases firm profits. 
Thus, unionized labor increases the wage rate. It follows that firms have 
incentives to undertake FDI to reduce union bargaining power. However, also 
unions could gain because of increased employment opportunities from FDI. 
In the case of reciprocal FDI, profits equal to ii xwp )( −=Π  for home 
production and ii ywp )(
** −=Π  for foreign production, with 2,1=i  and 
21 xxx += , 21 yyy +=  the sum of the output of firms 1 and 2 in the two 
countries. The firms participate with headquarters in negotiations, which occur 
simultaneously in the two countries. This situation could be exemplified by the 
presence of an agent in each country representing the total interest of the firm 
during the bargaining. It is also assumed that the agents of the same firm 
cannot communicate between them. Hence, the Nash product in the home 
country is  
βαβα −−∗∗∗∗ Π−Π+ΠΠ−Π+Π= 122211121 )()(),,( UxxwG          (37)  
where α , β , βα −−1  are the bargaining power of the home union, 
home firm and foreign firm, respectively; 1Π , 2Π , ∗Π1  and ∗Π 2  are the 
branch profits, U  is the union utility, 1
*
21
_
1 ])([ ywyyp −+=Π∗  and 
2
*
21
_
2 ])([ ywyyp −+=Π∗  are the foreign branch profits when the 
bargaining at home fails. In this case, production takes place only in the 
foreign country and eventually it is exported towards the home country. 
Therefore, the world price is )( 21
_
yyp + . Similarly, the Nash product in the 
foreign country is 
βαβα −−∗∗∗ Π−Π+ΠΠ−Π+Π= 1111222*21 )()()(),,( UyywG ,    (38)  
where 121
_
1 ])([ xwxxp −+=Π  and 221
_
2 ])([ xwxxp −+=Π  are 
the home branch profits when the bargaining in foreign fails: in this case, the 
MNE can produce only at home during strikes, and eventually export 
production towards the foreign country. The world price now is )( 21
_
xxp + . 
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This implies that, in the bargaining process, firms increased their outside 
option, improving their position face unions and lowering the negotiated wage 
rate. In fact, taking the symmetric solution in first order conditions, 
maximization of (37) and (38) gives 
wgppgw )1()2(
_ −+−=                    (39) 
))()(1()2( '
_
pyxpkppkw ++−+−=      (40) 
Now, since 
_
pp <  because of the reduction in world output in case of a 
failure in bargaining in one country), it follows that ppp <− _2 . The 
contract curve for each country is  
)()( ' yxppwww +−−=−θ
γ
,      (41) 
and its slope is positive (negative) if γθ )(>< . Thus, the negotiated wage 
in the case of reciprocal FDI is lower with respect to the wage when firms are 
not MNE (since 
_
' 'p p> ). However, reciprocal FDI decreases the wage in 
both countries with respect to the benchmark case, but the employment in 
equilibrium increases (decreases) depending whether the union is wage 
(employment) oriented. Analyzing the asymmetric case (only one firm invests 
overseas while the rival does not), the author shows that this is the preferred 
situation for the investing firm. Profits are even higher with respect to the case 
of reciprocal FDI. However, the non-FDI firm loses market shares in its own 
country, experiencing a decrease in profits. Thus, both firms have a dominant 
strategy in investing abroad. Under the symmetry assumption, the Nash 
equilibrium of this non-cooperative game is unique: Invest-Invest for both 
firms. Cross-hauling FDI arises in equilibrium. As regard welfare, in the 
presence of wage oriented unions, employment increases in case of reciprocal 
FDI, implying higher welfare levels. Instead, with employment oriented 
unions both employment and welfare decrease. Therefore, from a policy point 
of view, whether FDI is welfare enhancing depends on the union preferences. 
Nevertheless, wages turn out to be always lower in the presence of FDI than 
without investment. 
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Instead, Zhao (1998) constructs a general equilibrium model analyzing the 
impact of FDI on the determination of wages and employment in the presence 
of unions. Applying a Nash bargaining process to model labor-management 
negotiations at the industry level similar to Zhao (1995), the author shows that 
FDI depresses the negotiated wage in the unionized sector independently of 
whether or not the union is wage or employment oriented. Wages decrease 
because of two effects. First, there is the threat point effect: that is, in case of a 
strike, the investing firm can produce abroad. As a consequence, firms’ 
position during the bargaining process is stronger and the negotiating wages 
reduced. Second, the two firms jointly negotiate with the industry union in one 
round, internalizing the external effect of changes in wages and quantities 
levels on each other; this  reduces wages (i.e., the collusive effect). He also 
finds that if the union is employment oriented or if it equally cares about 
employment and wages, FDI reduces union employment and the competitive 
wage in the non unionized sector. However, if labor-management negotiations 
are firm specific, but the union remains industry-wide, then FDI increases the 
employment alternatives of the union at the same time as it benefits the MNE. 
The threat point for the union in case of a strike increases because now the 
union may extract part of the rents from the non-striking firm. The threat point 
effect of the firms is unaffected; nonetheless, with firms bargaining separately, 
the collusive effect disappears. Both effects together increase wages. Finally, if 
union organization is also shifted to firm-level, the consequence is that the 
union’s threat point during the bargaining process lowers. Firms’ situation 
remains unaltered, and this will reduce the negotiated wage rate. Finally, the 
author discusses the case of the international union cooperation: the intuition is 
that, if cooperation occurs, the unions’ relative bargaining power will increases 
since their outside options will improve. 
The issue of intra-industry FDI investigated by Zhao (1995) represents also 
the subject of Naylor and Santoni (2003). The authors build up a three-stage 
game model where in the first stage firms invest abroad only if they are willing 
to pay a fixed cost; otherwise they can only sell in their domestic market. 
Since Naylor and Santoni (2003) focuses their study on the market for services 
(involving production in loco), the possibility to serve a foreign market 
through exports is ruled out by assumption. Product markets are national 
(segmented) rather than global (integrated). Wage bargaining (like in (27)) 
with decentralized unions takes place under a right-to-manage model, and a 
degree of products’ substitutability (see (13)) is present. Competition in the 
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product market is of the Cournot type. It is found that the main driving force 
for reciprocal FDI is not to weaken unions’ bargaining positions but the 
capture of foreign market shares. Nonetheless, a higher union strength in a 
potential host economy makes less likely the possibility that FDI will be 
undertaken. In fact, the symmetric bargained wage in equilibrium within a 
country is 
)4(
))(2(
_
αγ
γα
−
−−+= wawwi        (42) 
with 2,1=i denoting the two countries. From (42), it is directly derived 
that 0>∂∂ αiw : an increase in the union bargaining power translates in 
higher wages. This in turns implies that firm profits in the potential host 
country, given by 
)4)(2(
))(2(2
_
αγγ
α
−+
−−=Π waij  ,  jiji ≠= ;2,1,     (43) 
will be lower as long as the union bargaining power increases                       
( 0<∂Π∂ αij ). With the additional assumption of symmetry between 
countries, the authors are also able to show that, as long as the product 
substitutability increases, the FDI game between firms may assume the 
characteristics of a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. With low firms’ bargaining 
power and high product substitutability, autarky is more advantageous. 
Product substitutability intensifies product market competition, decreasing 
profits; and with lower firms’ bargaining power, the negotiated wages are 
higher, especially in duopoly. Therefore, under these circumstances, firms are 
more likely to prefer autarky. However, one of the firms may still find gainful 
to invest abroad if the rival firm does not. The investing firm benefits from 
sales in the foreign product market and does not suffer competition in the 
domestic market; that is, each firm has a dominant strategy over FDI. 
However, this hurts the rival firm. Thus, the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma 
logic applies. If the scale of fixed costs is adequately low, both firms will 
invest abroad, and reciprocal FDI will arise in equilibrium. 
The analysis of the effects of different union organization levels as well as 
different negotiation levels on the incentives of a MNE in undertaking FDI in a 
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country and the impact on host country’s welfare is also a key focus in the 
work of Leahy and Montagna (2000). The framework, however, is different 
from Zhao (1995). In Leahy and Montagna (2000), a MNE can invest in the 
unionized domestic country, where n  symmetric local firms are already active 
in the product market. The demand function is linear. Labor is the unique 
factor of production, but the MNE is assumed more productive than local 
firms. In the first stage, the MNE decides if to locate a production facility in 
the host country or not. In the second stage, monopoly unions, with a constant 
bargaining power across firm, chooses the wage rate. The cases of 
decentralized unions (fixing firm specific wages), as well as one central union 
(with central or firm specific wages), are considered. In the third stage, firms 
decide employment (and, hence, output levels), according to the right-to-
manage approach. Two sub-cases are analyzed: the MNE has no product 
market interaction with local firms (i.e., a platform for export FDI); the MNE 
and local firms compete in quantities either in the host country or in a foreign 
country. If no product market interaction occurs, the centralized wage is lower 
than the decentralized wage paid by the MNE because the labor market creates 
a link between the domestic firms and the MNE. It follows that unions limit 
the rent appropriation from the MNE to save employment levels in the less 
efficient domestic firms. Higher productivity levels in the MNE do not always 
ensure higher centralized wages: a trade off between the wage rate and the 
employment level is present. Thus, the MNE benefits from industry wide 
wages. Consequently, the “conventional” claim that a MNE always prefers 
decentralized wage negotiations is not supported. The welfare level in the host 
country is higher with the presence of the MNE than without, irrespective of 
the degree of centralization in negotiations. However, given that decentralized 
wages are higher than the industry-wide wage, divergences among the host 
country government and the MNE may arise concerning the bargaining level.  
If there is product market interaction, the results change. The centralized 
wage is higher than the decentralized wage, at least for a large number of firms 
and low productivity levels. This result contrasts the case of non-market 
interaction. This is so due to the cooperative behavior by the centralized union 
which internalizes product market externalities. Concerning host country’s 
welfare, the presence of a MNE lowers domestic welfare independently of the 
bargaining level. In case of no domestic sales, inward FDI always reduces 
welfare for 1>n . Low product market competition and productivity levels 
make the welfare cost of the MNE entry in the export sector higher under 
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decentralized bargaining, but for high MNE’s productivity levels, the opposite 
holds true: centralized bargaining is more costly. The MNE extracts profits 
from the local firms and repatriates these rents to its home country. 
Nevertheless, the authors show that if the MNE invests, the MNE and the host 
Government in some cases have a common interest about centralized 
bargaining. In case of domestic sales, inward FDI ensures welfare gains under 
the decentralized bargaining, but a conflict of interest among the host country 
Government and the MNE may arise about centralization. Finally, in case of a 
centralized union fixing firm specific wages, the MNE’s welfare value is 
positive if firms compete in the host country market while it is negative if 
firms compete in a foreign product market, with welfare losses lower than 
decentralized and standard centralized regimes. However, in case of product 
market interaction, the union exploits the higher MNE’s productivity levels 
and charges a wage level higher than that of the local firms. Summarizing, the 
MNE prefers centralized bargaining unless in the case of centralized firm 
specific wages and lower productivity advantages; in case of domestic 
competition, host country’s welfare is expected to decrease because of inward 
FDI, since the MNE captures rents from local producers.  
Bughin and Vannini (2003) extend the study of Leahy and Montagna 
(2000) concerning the relation between unionization and FDI, and welfare 
effects in an oligopoly market structure taking into account also an efficient 
bargaining model in negotiations. A Cournot-Nash duopoly model for  
homogeneous goods, with labor unique factor of production and constant 
marginal costs, is analyzed. One firm is domestic, while the other is a MNE. 
The product demand is linear, and decentralized unions maximize rents taking 
as given the exogenous foreign wage level in negotiations. The MNE should 
decide between FDI and exports (no trade costs are considered) as market 
entry option in the domestic country. These authors compare the welfare 
effects under the right-to-manage and the efficient bargaining models. The 
main findings are as follows. The efficient bargaining may be a sufficient 
condition for inward FDI to improve domestic welfare, provided that union 
relative bargaining power is not to high to deter the MNE’s market entry. 
Labor costs are not the unique key variable in the MNE choice among export 
and FDI; profit arbitrage matters, especially under efficient bargaining because 
of rent sharing with the unions. Finally, conflict of interest among the host 
country and the MNE may arise as regards the preference over FDI. During 
the negotiations, unions may support the domestic government in term of 
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favoring FDI; however, this effect is stronger with the right-to-manage model 
than with efficient bargaining, unless the union strength is too high: in this 
case, the MNE does not undertake FDI because the rent sharing effect 
overcomes the typical output expansion effect occurring under efficient 
bargaining.  
The work of Mukherjee and Suetrong (2007) also focuses on the influence 
that different unionization structures has on the firms’ decision to make FDI. 
Differently from Leahy and Montagna (2000), these authors investigate this 
issue in a two-country model: the “domestic” country is unionized, while the 
labor market in the “foreign” country is perfectly competitive. The relevant 
product market for the homogeneous goods is the foreign one, and firms 
compete à la Cournot. The unionized domestic firms decide whether to serve 
the foreign country through exports or to undertake FDI, paying exogenous 
sunk costs. The number of firms engaging in FDI is endogenously determined. 
Wages are set either by decentralized firm-level unions, or uniformly by one 
industry-wide union. The main results are as follows. If all firms export, the 
centralized wage is always higher than the decentralized wage. The same 
result holds for a given number of firms undertaking FDI. However, the 
authors show that incentives for outward FDI are lower with decentralized 
than with centralized wage negotiations. Thus, when firms actively decide 
over FDI, if the investing firms’ number under centralization is greater than 
under firm-level wage settings, decentralization may lead to higher wages and 
union utility than the industry-wide wage setting.  
Mukherjee (2008) questions why MNEs often use both export and FDI as 
means to penetrate foreign markets. In his model, a MNE is located in its 
domestic country. The factor of production is only labor. Wages in the 
domestic country are perfectly competitive and exogenous, while in the 
foreign country wages are endogenously determined by a monopoly labor 
union which fixes firm specific wage rates. The MNE exports the goods to 
serve the foreign country, which is the relevant product market; there are 
neither tariffs imposed by the foreign country’s Government, nor 
transportation costs. In addition, the MNE can undertake a FDI in the foreign 
country, paying some fixed costs. In the foreign country, there is a local firm 
which also pays union wages and competes à la Cournot with the MNE. The 
timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the MNE chooses among 
FDI, export, or both. In the second stage, the MNE commits to its export level. 
This represents to a certain extent a long run decision. The author’s rationale 
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for this structure resides in the MNE’s capacity choice in its domestic plant: 
the MNE builds production facilities in the home country, and this is a long-
term decision. On the other hand, this can be profitable for the MNE because 
this leads to a first-mover advantage: the MNE can credibly threat to export a 
positive quantity. In the third stage, the host country union sets wages before 
the MNE decides the production quantity in the foreign country. Finally, both 
firms choose quantities and compete in the foreign product market. Given this 
game structure, it follows that if wage rates are too high abroad, the MNE will 
produce at home. Instead, with low wages, the union in the foreign country 
may be able to attract FDI. Mukherjee shows that the MNE chooses its market 
entry strategy in relation to the market size. The MNE uses only FDI and does 
not export in the presence of a small product market. In that case, the union 
selects lower wage rates than in the domestic country to attract the MNE. For 
an “intermediate” market size, the MNE chooses to serve the foreign market 
partially with FDI and exports: the MNE uses FDI and exports as 
complements. Using the threat of supplying the foreign market at least partly 
with exports, the MNE induces the foreign union to lower wages. Finally, in a 
large market, union wages are lower in the domestic country than in the host 
country. Therefore, the MNE chooses only the export option. 
Mukherjee and Marjit (2009) investigate how firm productivity affects the 
export-FDI decision of a MNE to serve a foreign country when labor is 
unionized. The model is rather simple: there is only  one firm and one union. 
Both the domestic and the foreign labor markets are unionized. In the first 
stage, the firm chooses between export and FDI. In the second stage, a rent-
maximizing union and the firm bargain over wages. In the third stage, output is 
realized. The unions’ bargaining power, as well as labor productivity, is 
symmetric among countries. The only difference is in the reservation wage, 
which is supposed to be higher in the foreign (host) country. The demand in 
the relevant market, the foreign country, is linear. If the firm chooses to export, 
it pays a constant per unit transportation costs; if it undertakes FDI, it incurs in 
sunk costs of building a production facility abroad. The main result is that, 
with unionized labor markets, there are situations where a firm choosing 
exports is more productive than foreign investors; this occurs even if the wage 
rate in the foreign country is higher than in the domestic country. For 
extremely low and high productivity levels, foreign investors are more 
productive than exporters, while the opposite holds for intermediate 
productivity levels. This is so because of the interdependence among trade 
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costs, sunk cost of the investment and the negotiated wage rate, and their 
effects on output decisions.  
The choice among exports and FDI in a context of trade liberalization is the 
subject investigated in a class of papers pioneered by the work of Lommerud 
et al. (2003). As in Naylor (1998, 1999), trade liberalization is depicted by a 
marginal reduction in trade costs when production is exported from one 
country to another. In their model, there are two countries: the domestic 
country is unionized, while the foreign country is non-unionized and pays 
exogenous competitive wages. At the beginning, there is one firm in each 
country. In the domestic country operates a rent-maximizing monopoly union. 
The market segmentation’s hypothesis applies. The demand for the 
homogeneous goods is linear. Both firms incur in tariffs when they export. 
While the foreign firm can only export, the firm in the domestic country may 
choose among three options. It can stay local, exporting its production. It may 
undertake a partial FDI in the non-unionized country to serve that market, 
producing in both countries: in this case, the domestic firm pays some sunk 
costs to set up a plant abroad. Finally, it can completely relocate in the foreign 
country, closing domestic plants and exporting production back toward the 
domestic country. The authors suppose that total relocation is more expensive 
than the partial. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the 
domestic firm decides whether to relocate, partially or locally, in the foreign 
country. In the second stage, the domestic union set the wage rate. Finally, in 
the third stage, firms act as Cournot competitors in both markets. Like in 
Naylor’s works, the union wage strategy differs depending on trade cost levels, 
and for sufficiently low values of these costs, a marginal decrease of trade 
barriers implies an increase in the wage level. This is so because access to the 
foreign market is now easier (product market expansion effect) for the 
domestic firm, and this implies an increase in the domestic labor demand. At 
the same time, competition in the domestic country becomes more severe: the 
foreign firm increases exports. Nonetheless, the net effect is positive, and the 
domestic union responds setting higher wages, capturing part of the oligopoly 
rents, and thus obtaining a higher utility. However, high domestic wages give a 
strong incentive for making FDI. This holds both for partial FDI because 
domestic wages still increase but there are few workers employed in the 
domestic country; and for complete relocation, because exporting back to the 
domestic unionized country turns out to be cheaper. It follows that trade 
liberalization, in combination with strong unions, may induce firms to 
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undertake FDI to success a distributional conflict. With a tariff reduction, the 
FDI level increases, union rents decrease and the other gains are not sufficient 
to offset these losses. In addition, profit shifting from domestic owners in the 
unionized countries to owners in the foreign non-unionized country reduces 
the overall domestic welfare. 
Differently from Lommerud et al. (2003), Glass and Saggi (2005) 
determine endogenously the equilibrium FDI regime without considering the 
effects of trade liberalization. In their international oligopoly model, two firms 
producing homogeneous goods are located in two different countries. Markets 
are segmented and differ in sizes. The demand function is linear, and each firm 
may supply the foreign market via FDI or alternatively via exports. Per unit 
trade costs are supposed sufficiently low such that downstream firms may 
always export their production. Both firms require one intermediate good that 
a local upstream monopolist supplier provides. Local suppliers can be 
interpreted as labor unions. By assumption, one unit of the final good needs 
one unit of the intermediate. The model is a three-stage game, and the timing 
is as follows. First, firms in the downstream market decide as regards FDI or 
exports. In the second stage, the upstream suppliers (unions) fix 
simultaneously prices (wages); finally, Cournot competition in the downstream 
market takes place. If markets are of similar sizes, reciprocal FDI arises in 
equilibrium: to invest is a dominant strategy. This decreases global welfare 
because the indirect (wages affect the downstream firms’ costs, and, therefore, 
employment levels) competition among the two monopolistic input suppliers is 
eliminated. This is so because the upstream prices (wages) are set after the 
downstream firms’ decision of producing in both countries. Furthermore, one-
way FDI increases the wage rate in both countries. In the FDI host country, 
wages increase because the demand for labor increases, and the local union 
may claim a higher wage. However, wages increase also in the domestic 
country. Falling demand for labor in the domestic country has a negative effect 
on wages (demand effect); but there is also a strategic effect at work: the 
foreign labor union’s reaction function shifts outward implying an increase in 
the foreign wage. Domestic wage increases due to wage complementarity, and 
the strategic effect can dominate the demand effect; that is, in this model, 
outward FDI acts like a cost-raising strategy. 
Ishida and Matsushima (2005) propose a slightly different version of 
Lommerud et al. (2003). In their duopoly model, two firms are initially located 
in one unionized country and can export their homogeneous goods to another 
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foreign country, competing à la Cournot in both product markets. Each firm 
has to pay a per unit transport costs for their export quantities. Two rent 
maximizing firm specific unions fix wages in the home country, while firms 
may freely choose quantities. By assumption, only one of the firms has the 
option to invest abroad. When this firm sets up a new production facility in the 
foreign country, the new plant is also unionized. Within this framework, the 
authors argue that, at first glance, the decision to undertake an FDI may 
increases the competitive position of the investing because of saving in 
transport costs, while the rival firm without this option may suffers. Counter 
intuitively, their analysis shows that the profits of the exporting firm can 
increase if the trade cost levels to the other market are sufficiently high. This is 
so because, to facilitate its firm to improve the competitive position in the 
foreign product market, the union operating in the exporting firm will cut its 
own wage rate by a sufficient amount to counterbalance the negative effect 
represented by the elimination of the transportation costs of the international 
firm. More intense competition can be beneficial for the exporting firm which 
experiences an increase in its profits because of the rival decision of 
undertaking FDI. Even more paradoxically, when some fixed costs of setting a 
new plant abroad are considered, in some cases the more efficient firm ends up 
with lower profits with respect to the exporting firm. 
Instead, Ishida and Matsushima (2009) investigate the welfare and policy 
implications of outward FDI in an unionized oligopoly. In their duopoly 
model, two firms are initially located in their domestic country, which is 
unionized with firm specific monopoly unions. The foreign country pays 
exogenous perfectly competitive wages. Labor is the sole factor of  production 
with a constant return to scale technology. Markets are segmented, and firms 
compete à la Cournot therein. If firms export, they incur in trade costs. Firms 
decide sequentially how to serve the foreign market: the first firm may set up a 
plant in the foreign country, relocating production; the second firm chooses 
whether to follow the rival. There are no fix costs to build up a production 
facility in the foreign country. The authors show that, in the presence of 
domestic competition, the second FDI always has a negative effect on 
domestic welfare when the markets’ sizes are similar. Most of the time, the 
asymmetric case with one FDI is socially desirable. This is so because the 
second union lowers its wage when the first firm invests overseas: the 
competitive situation for the second firm located in the home country is 
weakened. The second union is induced to decrease wages to facilitate its firm 
LABOR UNIONS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A REVIEW 
 
73 
in remaining in a competitive position in the foreign market. Since wages for 
the second firm are lower for all workers, it will produce at low costs for the 
home market, improving its domestic competitive position. Consequently, the 
first union can not increase the wages for domestic workers as much as it 
would like. Even if the first firm makes high profits in the foreign country, 
domestic output would be reduced if home wages increase. This, in turn, 
lowers employment in the first firm and hence its union utility. Summing up, 
the first FDI will moderate domestic wages, and the price goes down; 
consumer surplus increases and this gain offset the unions’ utility losses: 
overall national welfare increases. Nevertheless, if the second firm is also 
involved in outward FDI, wages rise in the home country. The reason is that, 
in this situation, both unions extract a higher share of domestic rents from their 
firms. This reduces output in the home market, prices increase, consumer 
surplus declines, and domestic welfare decreases. However, Ishida and 
Matsushima show that the welfare losses of two outward FDI are mainly not 
the consequence of lower union utility but rather from lower consumer 
surplus. Unions can benefit under certain conditions from the second FDI 
since wage rivalry tends to disappear and wage gains may offset employment 
reduction, increasing union utility. 
In spite of the differences in the underlying assumptions and purposes of 
study, these models, most of the time, achieves this result: when firms may 
invest in a foreign country, they improve their outside option in the bargaining 
process. Thus, unions’ position in negotiations is put under pressure inducing a 
moderation in wage claims.12 Though, the subject of the international union 
cooperation in this context, mainly in the form of wage coordination, is 
lacking and not explored. 
5. The impact of internationalization on labor unions: review of empirical 
studies 
Up to date, the economic literature presents a large body of empirical works 
(principally focused on OECD countries) investigating the effects of 
increasing economic integration on labor markets outcomes in terms of wage 
                                                 
12 The idea that MNE can strategically exploit the spread of productive activities across 
countries to improve their bargaining positions and avoid the creation of encompassing unions 
was originally expressed by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and further developed by Leahy and 
Pavelin (2004). 
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and employment levels.13 However, the consequences of internationalization 
for organized labor have been mainly investigated indirectly.14 Based on 
micro-data, few recent papers have analyzed the direct effects on the European 
labor unions’ outcomes.15 These are the works of Brock and Dobbalaere 
(2006), Dumont et al. (2006, 2010), Abraham et al. (2009), Boulhol et al. 
(2011), and Dobbalaere and Mairesse (2011).  
Brock and Dobbalaere (2006) investigate the impact of internationalization 
on the unions’ bargaining power in the Belgian manufacturing sectors. The 
authors’ analysis theoretically grounds on an efficient bargaining model with 
risk neutral unions. They use data from an unbalanced panel of annual 
company accounts of all Belgian firms for the period 1987-1995, collected by 
the National Bank of Belgium. The methodology strategy is a two-stage 
estimation procedure. In the first stage, the authors proceed with the estimation 
of the unions’ bargaining power by regressing the negotiated wage for fifteen 
sectors. Two approaches are used. In the first one, they get a unique estimate 
of the union bargaining power for all sectors over all years. In the second 
approach, they obtain yearly estimates of the union bargaining power for each 
sector. Then, in the second stage, they regress the estimated union bargaining 
                                                 
13 Radulescu and Robson (2008), and McGuinnes et al. (2010), investigate the inverse causal 
effect (how unionization and collective bargaining systems affect the firms’ internationalization 
choices in the form of FDI). Using cross-national time-series data from mid ’70s to 1997 for 19 
OECD countries (among these, 14 European economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
UK), Radulescu and Robson (2008) find strong evidence that a high level of union density (used 
as proxy for union bargaining power) reduces the incentives for a MNE in selecting a country as 
a potential location for FDI. Instead, in case of close substitutes goods and MNE having 
productivity advantages respect to domestic firms, higher degrees of bargaining coordination 
moderates the negative impact that a high level of union density may have on the expected 
inward FDI: a country may be more attractive for FDI due to the reduction of output at the 
expenses of domestic firms. Making use of a linked employer-employee data set, the empirical 
investigation of McGuinnes et al. (2010) gets similar results for Ireland.  
14 For a general review see Molnar et al. (2007) and references therein. As regards European 
countries, recent empirical analysis on the indirect effects of internationalization on unionized 
workers are, i.a., Guadalupe (2007) for U.K., Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) for France, and 
Martins and Opramolla (2009) for Portugal based on firm-level data. Instead, based on linked 
employer-employee data, Schank et al. (2007) for Germany, Lundin and Yun (2009) for 
Sweden, and Du Caju et al. (2011) for Belgium. 
15 Notable empirical contributions investigating the impact of internationalization on labor 
unions for countries outside the EU are Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada; Bojas and 
Ramey (1995), and Gaston and Trefler (1995) for U.S.  
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power on different measures of trade, FDI, technology and a set of control 
variables. The main results are the following. The authors find little evidence 
as regards international trade and inward FDI affecting the unions’ bargaining 
power. Instead, there is evidence that technological changes positively 
influence it. According to these authors, there are several reasons that could 
explain these findings. One possible explanation is that international economic 
integration may affect the unions’ bargaining power of different skill groups in 
a different way: some workers become more essential in the production 
process, and labor costs might be declining because of technological 
improvements. A second reason may be that other, more direct, channels than 
the unions’ bargaining power affect labor market outcomes, such as the firms 
and workers’ outside options during negotiations. 
The paper of Dumont et al. (2006) studies how international trade affected 
the bargaining power of labor unions in eight sectors of five EU countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and U.K.). These authors also make use of a 
two-step estimation procedure, based on a rent-sharing theoretical framework. 
Using company level data, in the first stage they estimate for each country the 
sector level unions’ bargaining power. The authors simultaneously test the 
bargaining regime and the unions’ preferences to determine if it exists a wage-
employment tradeoff due to internationalization. In the second stage, they 
regress the estimated union bargaining power on two groups of variables. The 
first group reflects the level of international competitiveness, distinguishing 
among import competition from OECD and Newly Industrialized Countries. 
The second group considers other potential determinants of the union 
bargaining power such as the industry concentration and capacity rate, the 
ratio of R&D expenses for patenting revenues, and the skill ratio. The key 
findings of their empirical investigation are as follows. In every country, the 
results show that unions have some bargaining power during negotiations; this 
is higher in France and Germany, intermediate in Belgium, and lower in Italy 
and U.K. In almost all sectors and countries, unions and firms seem to bargain 
according to the labor-hoarding model, with some exception in favor of the 
efficient bargaining (mainly in Germany). Thus, employment enters into the 
bargaining process. Unions are predominantly wage oriented. These results 
suggest that a wage-employment tradeoff due to increasing foreign 
competitiveness exists. The authors find evidence that import competition 
affects negatively the union bargaining power. The impact is equivalent if 
imports come from OECD and Newly Industrialized Countries. This, in turns, 
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lowers negotiated wages. However, the estimates suggest that increasing 
internationalization does not affect unions’ preferences over wages.   
Abraham et al. (2009) investigate the impact of European and global 
economic integration on labor and product markets in Belgium, focusing on 
manufacturing firms. Based on a production function approach with efficient 
bargaining model and risk-neutral unions, the authors use firm-level data for 
the period 1996-2004 for a simultaneous estimation of price-cost margins 
(index of product market power) and union bargaining power, and they 
investigate the effects of various aspects of globalization such as import 
penetration, outsourcing and direct investments on them. The analysis 
proceeds first with an estimate of the average measures of the mark-up and 
union bargaining power for the whole manufacturing sector. Then, a detailed 
analysis for each industry follows. The authors find that there is a strong, 
positive correlation between the union bargaining power and product market 
power. In other words, unions get higher rents in those sectors with higher 
mark-ups while the opposite occurs in more competitive industries 
(international competition diminishes firms’ rents). As regards the impact of 
internationalization, they investigate how import competition from different 
origins affects the firms’ market power and the unions’ strength, 
differentiating among imports from EU-15, imports from 10 new-EU 
members, imports from OECD countries other than EU-25, and finally imports 
from countries outside OECD (low-wage countries). The results indicate that 
lower mark-ups and union bargaining power characterize those sectors with 
higher import penetration, especially from low-wage countries. However, the 
bargained wages increase in those industries with imports of intermediate 
goods from abroad. The rational is that the firms importing intermediates have 
to specify their amounts, quality and characteristics in advance to their foreign 
contractors. Thus, when the negotiations among unions and firms occur, the 
formers may have hold-up opportunities, increasing their bargaining power.  
Dumont et al. (2010) examine the effects of internationalization and 
technological change on unions’ bargaining positions representing different 
classes of workers, low skilled and high skilled. The theoretical basis for their 
two-stage empirical analysis is an efficient bargaining model in which two 
separate unions, one for low skilled and one for high skilled workers, bargain 
independently with the firm. The authors make use of firm-level data for ten 
Belgian manufacturing sectors in the period 2000-2008. They first estimate the 
labor bargaining power and the relative wage preference for the two groups of 
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workers. Then the estimated parameters are regressed on a set of possible 
explanatory variables to determine both the internationalization and 
technological change’s impacts for each skill group. The main findings are as 
follows. In the period under consideration, the bargaining power of low-skilled 
workers deteriorated while that of the high-skilled improved. Concerning the 
technological aspect, R&D intensity seems to have a positive impact on the 
bargaining power of low skilled workers. This is the only statistical relevant 
result. As regards the internationalization aspect, import competition decreased 
the mark-ups and the bargaining power in those sectors more exposed to 
international trade, especially from low-wage countries. In addition, offshoring 
and the presence of foreign subsidiaries had further negative impacts on the 
bargaining positions of low skilled workers. Instead, the union bargaining 
power of the high skilled group is unaffected by economic integration. In 
every sector, both unions are wage oriented, but the internationalization 
influences it for both types of unions. The results indicate that imports of close 
substitutes and offshoring of similar skill intensity activities, weaken the 
unions’ wage orientation; the opposite mechanism applies when imports and 
offshoring of production activities are skill complementary. Thus, the effect of 
internationalization on labor unions is skill specific. In short, this work 
suggests that economic integration more than technological change increased 
skill premium (wage inequality); and the reason resides in the different 
impacts of international integration on the unions’ bargaining position for the 
two groups of workers. 
Boulhol et al. (2011) explore the pro-competitive effects of trade in product 
and labor markets in U.K. manufacturing sectors. As Abraham et al. (2009), 
they base the empirical investigation on a theoretical production function with 
an efficient bargaining approach. However, they exploit a more general 
framework as regards the unions’ preferences toward risk. The authors use 
data from two firm-level surveys for 20 industries in the period 1998-2003. 
They proceed their empirical study with a two-stage estimation strategy. In the 
first stage, they simultaneously estimate price-cost margins and union 
bargaining power per sectors, and for three subsets of firms’ size and three 
sub-periods. They find that both decreased along the period considered. In the 
second stage, they relate the estimated markups and union bargaining power of 
each industry to trade variables such as the share of imports in the demand for 
each sector (making a distinction between developed and developing 
countries), the ratio of exports over total sales, plus other product and labor 
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market variables. The results of the second step show that the imports from 
developed countries significantly lower the markup and the union bargaining 
power of those industries exposed to foreign competition. Instead, exports 
weakly increase the union bargaining power. These findings define that 
international trade has an impact working in two opposite directions on price-
cost margins. However, according to the authors’ estimates, the labor market 
discipline effect (the reduction of the union bargaining power) 
counterbalanced for one half the product-market discipline effect from imports 
(the reduction of the mark-ups to marginal costs). Additionally, they find that 
firms with a smaller size have lower mark-ups, and their workers are in a 
relatively weak position during negotiations. 
Finally, also Dobbalaere and Mairesse’s (2011) study grounds on a 
theoretical production function model with efficient bargaining. These authors 
estimate price-cost margins and union bargaining power in 38 French 
manufacturing industries over the period 1978-2001, making use of an 
unbalanced panel of 10646 firms. The main objective of the paper is the 
estimation of average price-cost mark-ups and the extent of rent sharing 
parameters, first for manufacturing as a whole, and then for each industry, 
looking for across and within industries heterogeneity. As regards the impact 
of internationalization, the analysis of the single sectors shows that, in those 
industries facing high import competition, the estimated mark-up and union 
bargaining power is lower than the median value of the entire manufacturing, 
while the opposite occurs in the protected sectors. 
To sum up, exploiting different data sources and empirical methodologies, 
these studies seem to indicate that international integration is likely to weaken 
the unions’ bargaining positions, confirming most of the theoretical models’ 
predictions. Surprisingly, despite the actual evidences reported in the 
introduction, no empirical studies analyzed the effectiveness of cross borders 
unions’ cooperation to counterbalance the impact of internationalization 
during the negotiation processes. 
IV. Conclusions 
Economic integration has significant consequences for labor markets in 
Europe. The theoretical literature stresses that product market integration 
usually lowers the relative bargaining power of labor unions. One reason is 
that high wage demands cause more substantial job losses in those industries 
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exposed to international competition. In other words, European integration 
increases the sensibility of labor demand to wages, inducing unions to wage 
moderation. Moreover, the integration of capital markets in Europe allows 
firms to locate more easily their activities among different places. Thus, firms 
may avoid excessive wage demands by shifting production among different 
plants. This threat of relocation improves the relative bargaining position of 
firms respect to unions, leading to lower negotiated wages. 
By means of internationally coordinated wage claims, unions may improve 
their position during negotiations with employers. Coordination provides a 
countervailing power to the impact of product and capital markets integration. 
With some differences, this seems to be possible in those sectors characterized 
by intra-industry trade and the presence of large MNE having production 
facilities spread over different countries. 
Although attractive, transnational wage coordination by European labor 
unions is far to be implemented. Numerous obstacles prevent it. A first one is 
that employers’ associations oppose negotiations at the EU level, since the 
construction of a European platform for wage determination would reduce 
their relative bargaining position. Second, there are substantial differences 
among EU countries with respect to labor union practices: differences in union 
density, coverage, the degree of centralization and coordination in bargaining. 
Besides, there are differences related to the timing of wage bargaining and the 
labor unions’ role in national policy discussions. Such diversities cause 
international coordination to be expensive because of less flexibility; and 
coordination implies operational costs associated with meetings, information 
gathering, and so on. In addition, cooperation is harder to reach as long as the 
number of the unions involved in the process increases. It may be complicated 
to sign agreements and organize activities to achieve some common results 
without considering collateral problems like cultural, traditional and customary 
diversities between countries, leadership positions, and the pursuit of national 
interests. Moreover, there exist other structural asymmetries representing 
obstacles to international wage coordination. There is a large variety of labor 
market regulations between EU countries, such as minimum wages, 
unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, labor taxation, and 
labor market policy. These asymmetries increased after the 4th enlargement 
towards Central and Eastern European Countries. To agree upon a shared 
agenda among unions could become difficult; and a common policy may not 
be optimal for some individual members. This holds true also for blocs of 
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economic integration other than the EU. Asymmetries are present into the 
Mercado Común del Sur’s (MERCOSUR) custom union, which, however, 
provides for a fund to realize long term projects aiming at the structural 
convergence among member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay). Structural differences can be observed in the countries associated to 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia), whose aim is 
to lower gradually to zero most of their import duties among them. The 1994’s 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whose objective was to 
remove barriers to trade (tariff and non tariff) and investment between Mexico, 
the U.S. and Canada, exhibits as well striking differences in the labor market 
regulations, unionization structures and wage levels between the signatory 
states.  
Unions’ transnational activities ensuing the economic integration process 
received attention only in recent times, despite its significance in the analysis 
of the impact of internationalization on labor markets and their institutions. 
This survey reported some notable contributions that have helped a better 
understanding of this phenomenon. Nonetheless, many aspects still have to be 
fully explored. As mentioned, one subject is the presence of large asymmetries 
among countries. Another topic is the analysis of labor unions’ behavior 
regarding the international disintegration of productive activities, subsequent 
to capital market liberalization and according to perceived comparative 
advantages, in particular by MNE. The theoretical literature focused more on 
the effects of trade liberalization rather than the internationalization of 
production on unions’ cooperation. However, workers in every regional 
economic bloc equally perceive the concerns related to the spread of activities 
across countries. Finally, the prospect of further international labor union 
cooperation may influence the firms’ strategic decision related to international 
business. This, in turn, may affect both wage and employment’s paths; but also 
the productive structures and the industrial organization of the integrated areas. 
To relate these issues to the peculiarities of each regional bloc of economic 
integration needs a focus wider than the present work. This is left for future 
research. 
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